Facts
| PRC/U.S. Designation | M-7 (8610)/CSS-8 |
| Missile Variants | HQ-2 modified[i]/Tondar-69(Iran)[ii] |
| Mobility and Role | Road-mobile/Short-Range Ballistic Missile |
| Designer/Producer | People’s Republic of China |
| Range | 150km[iii] |
| Warhead Type and Weight | Conventional/190kg[iv] |
| MIRV and Yield | N.A. |
| Guidance System/Accuracy | Inertial/300m CEP “est”[v] |
| Stages/Propellant | Two/Solid (first) and liquid (second)[vi] |
| IOC/Retirement | late 1980s/N.A. |
| Status/Number of Units | Operational/2-5 launchers; 100-500 missiles “est”[vii] |
Overview
The M-7 (or 8610) is a road-mobile, short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) modeled after the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) HQ-2 surface to air missile (SAM), which itself is a modification of the Soviet SA-2 SAM.[viii] With two stages – the first solid fuel and the second liquid fuel – the M-7 has an estimated range of 150km and is accurate within approximately 300m.
Strategic Implications
Given the M-7’s lack of ability to execute “precision strike” missions,[ix] and its lack of mention in recent annual reports to Congress by the Office of the Secretary of Defense on “Military and Security Developments Involving the [PRC],” the M-7 does not appear to play a crucial role in the PRC’s ballistic missile arsenal other than the sheer numbers it adds to their estimated 1,200-strong SRBM inventory.[x] Since the late 1980s, several hundred M-7 SRBMs and related components have reportedly been sold by the PRC to Iran.[xi] Subsequently renamed the Tondar-69, Iran utilized this SRBM during military drills in September 2009.[xii]
Sources
[i] Anthony H. Cordesman, Strategic Threats and National Missile Defenses: Defending the U.S. Homeland, (Westport, US: Greenwood Press, 2001) p. 98.
[ii] Global Security, “DF-7 / M-7 / 8610 / CSS-8,” last modified April 20, 2014, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/china/m-7.htm.
[iii] Joseph Cirincione et al., Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, 2nd ed., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005, p. 106, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt6wpkbk.9.
[iv] Joseph Cirincione et al., Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, 2nd ed., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005, p. 106, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt6wpkbk.9.
[v] Moon Chung-In and Natalie W. Crawford, Emerging Threats, Force Structures & the Role of Air Power in Korea, (Santa Monica, US: RAND Corporation, 2000) p. 196.
[vi] Joseph Cirincione et al., Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, 2nd ed., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005, p. 106, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt6wpkbk.9.
[vii] Moon Chung-In and Natalie W. Crawford, Emerging Threats, Force Structures & the Role of Air Power in Korea, (Santa Monica, US: RAND Corporation, 2000) p. 196.
[viii] Global Security, “DF-7 / M-7 / 8610 / CSS-8.”
[ix] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2010, p. 72, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20Military%20Power%20Report.pdf.
[x] Ibid., p. 25.
[xi] Global Security, “DF-7 / M-7 / 8610 / CSS-8.”
[xii] Jenny Percival, “Iran Says it Has Carried Out Successful Short-Range Missile Tests,” The Guardian, September 27, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/27/iran-nuclear-weapons.
