Dear Members and Friends,
The highly esteemed International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which was formed in 1957 as a nuclear watchdog and reports directly to the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, released its much anticipated and overdue report this week on the current status and progress of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear programs. The detailed 25-page report provides the collective data to show that Iran is moving faster towards nuclear weapon development, as well as the development to deliver to distant targets, then what was perceived and projected.
Members from the United States intelligence community have testified before the United States Congress prior to this IAEA report that 2015 was the earliest date for Iranian nuclear weapon capability.
It is clearly within the American public’s expectations and rights that our United States homeland be adequately protected and defended against nuclear weapons from Iran, which may now be developed earlier than 2015. Regardless of the current atmosphere of defense budget cuts, solutions of United States missile defense systems to defeat long-range ballistic missiles from Iran must be addressed, solved, funded, and adequately deployed in numbers and layers. Our nation cannot dare risk nor afford the consequences of a ballistic missile nuclear capable Iran.
Further, our allies and U.S. troops forward deployed in the Middle East and Europe cannot be undefended and unprotected from Iran. An unstable Middle East that cannot deter or dissuade a nuclear Iran will create a greater likelihood of an armed conflict that could grow into a catastrophic regional disaster of epic proportions. Deploying layered, adequate inventories of U.S. missile defense systems to our forward operating bases in the Middle East and Europe, as well as supporting our Allies that have missile defense systems, will significantly stabilize the region and create deterrence to Iran, as well as to Israel in preemptive military action against Iran.
In response to this IAEA report release, the Israel Defense Minister Ehud Barak stated, “As long as no such sanctions have been imposed and proven effective, we continue to recommend to our friends in the world and to ourselves, not to take any option off the table.”
It is without doubt that our global world needs to look at all avenues, including missile defense, to deter and dissuade Iran’s nuclear ambition, but our global world must equally find avenues to cope with a determined nuclear Iran that cannot be deterred or dissuaded, without resorting to Armageddon of the Middle East.
Some key excerpts of the IAEA report:
- However, as indicated in paragraph 22* above, information contained in the alleged studies documentation suggests that Iran was working on a project to secure a source of uranium suitable for use in an undisclosed enrichment programme, the product of which would be converted into metal for use in the new warhead which was the subject of the missile re-entry vehicle studies. Additional information provided by Member States indicates that, although uranium was not used, kilogram quantities of natural uranium metal were available to the AMAD Plan.
22*. According to the Agency’s assessment of the information contained in that documentation, the green salt project (identified as Project 5.13) was part of a larger project (identified as Project 5) to provide a source of uranium suitable for use in an undisclosed enrichment programme. The product of this programme would be converted into metal for use in the new warhead which was the subject of the missile re-entry vehicle studies (identified as Project 111). As of May 2008, the Agency was not in a position to demonstrate to Iran the connection between Project 5 and Project 111. However, subsequently, the Agency was shown documents which established a connection between Project 5 and Project 111, and hence a link between nuclear material and a new payload development programme.
- In an interview in 2007 with a member of the clandestine nuclear supply network, the Agency was told that Iran had been provided with nuclear explosive design information. From information provided to the Agency during that interview, the Agency is concerned that Iran may have obtained more advanced design information than the information identified in 2004 as having been provided to Libya by the nuclear supply network.
- According to that documentation, using a number of commercially available computer codes, Iran conducted computer modelling studies of at least 14 progressive design iterations of the payload chamber and its contents to examine how they would stand up to the various stresses that would be encountered on being launched and travelling on a ballistic trajectory to a target. It should be noted that the masses and dimensions of components identified in information provided to the Agency by Member States that Iran is alleged to have been developing (see paragraphs 43 and 48 above) correspond to those assessed to have been used in Project 111 engineering studies on the new payload chamber.
Click here for the full IAEA report.
