Dear Members and Friends,
Last month, in recognition of missile defense excellence from five NATO European countries: France, Spain, the Netherlands, Italy and Germany (Click here to visit our European Defender of the Year Award Ceremony event webpage), MDAA had the unique opportunity to visit the commands and facilities of two of the most capable Missile Defense countries in NATO-Europe: Germany at its HQ in Husum (Click here to view articles and pictures from MDAA’s visit to Germany) and the Netherlands at its HQ in Vredepeel (Click here to view articles and pictures from MDAA’s visit to the Netherlands). Both of these countries have Missile Defense capabilities, employing PAC-3 interceptors launched from upgraded Patriot batteries. Germany has twelve Patriot Batteries and the Netherlands has three. These nations have also grouped Air Defense Batteries alongside Patriot Batteries, with Germany having four Air Defense Batteries and the Netherlands having one. In addition, the Netherlands has four BMD-capable frigates to provide tracking and targeting for U.S. Aegis BMD ships, as was exercised last fall with the Dutch frigate the De Zeven Provinciën during the 2015 non-NATO Maritime Theater Missile Defense Forum (MTMD) At Sea Demonstration. (Click here to read MDAA’s alert on the non–NATO MTMD At Sea Demonstration).
In 2013, German and Dutch competence in modern day Missile Defense was validated when Turkey requested an emergency consultation from NATO–under Article Four of the NATO Charter–to defend against Scud missiles from Syria. In response, both Germany and the Netherlands–in addition to Spain–deployed and operated four Patriot Batteries alongside four U.S. Patriot Batteries in Southwestern Turkey. NATO looks to their leadership in interoperability as these two countries annually exercise live firings of their missile and air defense batteries together alongside U.S. firing crews from the 5-7 ADA Battalion at the NAMFI (NATO Missile Firing Installation) base in Crete, Greece. (Click here to read MDAA’s alert on last year’s firing exercise at the NAMFI base in Crete).
NATO requires a “coalition of the willing” to contribute to and fund the common defense of Europe and each member-country should strive to spend the established goal of 2% of its GDP on a collective defense. Only five of the twenty-eight NATO member-countries fulfill this pledge (the United States, Greece, Poland, the United Kingdom, and Estonia); Germany at 1.3% and the Netherlands at 1% of their respective GDPs do not. Yet Germany foremost and the Netherlands are the dominant and proactive leaders of NATO-Europe on Air and Missile Defense, as they propagate existing relationships of trust, knowledge and expertise to other European NATO members–such as the Scandinavian members–in their role. Alongside the young up-and-coming NATO members from Eastern Europe, namely Poland and Romania, are the southern countries of Spain, Italy and France, all of which are investing in Air and Missile Defense systems. This investment shows the severity of NATO’s perceived threat to Europe and comes under the shadow of the massive U.S. European Phased Adaptive Approach, with shared common Command and Control that–when completed in 2020–will deploy U.S. platforms in the European theater to track, target and intercept “upper tier” space ballistic missile threats from the Middle East–namely Iran.
Air and Missile threats to NATO from near-peer adversaries–rather than Iran–are driving the movement for coordinated and interoperable Air and Missile Defenses between NATO allies, which provide more deterrence, air superiority and area-denial than the EPAA. Repeated aggressive encroachment into NATO air-space, demonstrations of air- and sea-launched long-range cruise missiles, placement of numerous air defense systems–that deny air superiority and access into half of Poland and all of the Baltic states–and deployment of tactical short-range offensive missiles are all indicators that Russia has become a serious threat which must be addressed, deterred, and contained by NATO.
While addressing current threats, NATO still must seek to provide an interoperable and integrated Air and Missile Defense for its territories and expeditionary military forces against future threats–known and unknown. Three new initiatives should be discussed at the upcoming NATO Summit, which can provide the conductivity of building an integrated NATO Air and Missile Defense capability for expeditionary use within and outside of Europe.
- Establish A NATO Air and Missile Defense Command headed by a European Flag Officer that rotates its command with the United States. This would be similar to the AAMDC flag officers of the U.S. Army, which advises the Air Commanders in EUCOM, CENTCOM and PACOM on Air and Missile Defense.
- Establish a Center of Excellence Training Center for Joint NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defense in Husum, Germany and/or Vredepeel, Netherlands to train and exercise all components of NATO Air and Missile Defense within the NATO Force. This would be similar to the joint U.S.-Emirati Air and Missile Defense Center of Excellence in Abu Dhabi, which allows the UAE to enhance the operational and cooperative infrastructure of the GCC.
- Establish a NATO a mobile expeditionary Air and Missile Defense force, based in Europe, that will train and conduct live-fire exercises annually. This force will be comprised of contributions from each country, creating an interoperable platform from sensor-to-shooter (sea-based and land-based) to include Air and Missile Defense–from NASAMS to THAAD–with each NATO nation sharing the cost and burden of manning and equipping.
The President of Russia continues to be relentless in his influence upon NATO-Europe. Putin’s threats (Click here to read an article from CNN titled, “Russian President Vladimir Putin warns he’ll retaliate against NATO missiles”) this past weekend over the EPAA-mandated Aegis Ashore Sites in Romania and Poland are based on Russia’s concern that the 24 launchers at each Aegis Ashore site could be used to field offensive missiles. Russian leaders argue these offensive missiles threaten Russia–claiming such weapons are forbidden by the INF treaty, which the United States has been in complete compliance with for almost thirty years–but audaciously ignore the stand-off air power capability of NATO, which is a much more credible offensive threat to Russia than a limited defensive system in Romania and Poland. NATO’s stand-off air power capability can launch thousands of offensive missiles into Russia, all being delivered from within the airspace of NATO-Europe.
Ignoring President Putin’s public remarks, rather than proactively challenging them, is a roll of the dice that has not boded well in the past–from crossing red lines in Syria to the invasion of Ukraine when Russia took advantage of unchecked influence. Left unchallenged, Putin’s particular remarks against President Obama’s EPAA will most likely escalate, leading to further Russian aggression in response to declaration of NATO’s operationalization of Aegis Ashore in Romania and completion of EPAA phase two; which will be announced next month at the NATO Summit in Warsaw, Poland. (Click here to read an article titled, “NATO chief says Warsaw summit comes at a ‘critical time'”).
As this unfolds, there is no doubt that Air and Missile Defense is a priority for NATO, and a “coalition of the willing” made up of NATO member-states will be required to acquire, supply, man, deploy and operate the critical assets needed in building the joint interoperable partnership capacity for the defense of NATO-Europe.
