Shortly after the inauguration of President Obama and Vice President Biden in 2009, the administration made the decision to cancel the “3rd Site” for ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) in Poland and the Czech Republic, which was intended to defend Europe and the United States from Iranian Missiles. This decision included a commitment to build a more “flexible” system—the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA). The PAA would use the proven Standard Missile interceptor based aboard Navy ships, both on ships and also in a ground-based framework called Aegis Ashore. Two Aegis Ashore sites were selected—one in Poland and one in Romania. The system is designed to intercept and destroy the type of short to intermediate-range missiles in development by Iran that could threaten Europe. An upgraded Standard Missile could eventually be deployed to counter ICBMs launched from Iran aimed at the United States. At the time in Russia, President Dmitry Medvedev called the change “a responsible move,” adding that “we value the responsible approach of the U.S. President to our agreement. I am ready to continue our dialogue.”
In 2010, then-Vice President Biden addressed the Iranian threat in a speech to the European Union in Brussels, Belgium, and stated that “The United States and European Union have stood side-by-side to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons…Iran’s nuclear program violates its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and risks sparking a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.” Vice President Biden added, “In the face of the threat Iran poses, we are committed to the security of our allies.”
As reported by Reuters, at a 2011 conference in Washington, D.C. Ellen Tauscher, then the undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, said that the United States was prepared to offer Moscow written assurances that Aegis Ashore is not directed at Russia. But she added that “We cannot legally provide binding commitments, nor can we agree to limitations on missile defense, which must necessarily keep pace with the evolution of the threat.” She added that the European PAA missile defense system “certainly would only chase the tail of a Russian ICBM or SLBM.”
Fast-forwarding to 2022, Russian Iskander missiles are lined up in-depth and in breadth along the Ukrainian border, attempting to intimidate and bully Ukraine and NATO to extort concessions via appeasement. One of the concessions Russia is asking for is the dismantling of the U.S. Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Site in Poland which defends Continental Europe and its population from the Iranian Ballistic Missile threat. Tehran’s use of its ballistic missiles launched from Houthi-held territory in Yemen last month to strike U.S. bases in Iraq and the United Arab Emirates demonstrates that ballistic missiles are often Iran’s weapon of choice and that the regime is willing to employ its missile arsenal for coercive purposes. Europe, and NATO, must take note.
The missile defenses put in place within Europe over the past decade can defend against this Iranian threat. But due to capacity limits at the Poland Aegis sites, the system will not have a significant effect against Russia’s far, far more numerous strategic rocket forces. If, for some reason, NATO needed to execute an offensive strike against Russia, despite Putin’s vehement assertions the Aegis Ashore sites are not at all the means to do so. U.S. offensive strike weapons in Europe such as Tomahawk equipped ships in the Baltic Sea, North Sea, Adriatic, and the Mediterranean, along with F22s, B-1s, B-52s can deliver 1000 times more firepower against Russian strategic assets than the Aegis system in Poland could if it was converted into an offensive capability. The US and NATO have never expressed an intent to use the Aegis sites for offensive operations.
The deployment of Aegis Ashore in Poland is an extremely cost-effective and carefully designed system that uses defended area coverage to enable intercept points from the best location in Europe to defend the entire continent against an Iranian ballistic missile attack. By virtue of having an operational fixed Aegis Ashore site in Poland, three to four U.S. Navy BMD Aegis Ships that would otherwise have to constantly rotate on patrol to defend Europe from Iranian ballistic missile attacks can be released to perform other high-priority missions. Aegis Ashore remains a critical component of the NATO alliance and the Translatlantic defense of Europe.
Let there be no uncertainty. The Aegis site in Poland is essential to the defense against a clear and present ballistic missile threat from Iran. It is not designed for, nor able to, defeat the far more capable and numerous Russian ballistic missile arsenal. The United States should not trade the Aegis Ashore Site to appease Russia, this is not in the long-term national security interests of Europe or the United States nor does it contribute to the stability or credibility of NATO. The US and its Allies must hold strong on this issue.
