The Diplomat:
When we think about anti-access warfighting concepts, we typically think of China. Think again. The technologies that make an anti-access approach to coercion and combat possible have proliferated throughout Asia, including to North Korea. The strategists, policymakers, and contingency planners who make up the U.S.-South Korea alliance must begin thinking about North Korea in these terms, or risk coming up on the losing end of a limited conflict.
In The Diplomat and in a conference where I recently presented on North Korean nuclear strategy, I’ve explained why North Korea seeks an assured retaliation nuclear posture, and why in the midst of a conflict that posture will likely shift to an asymmetric escalationposture. In practical terms, the former implies North Korea would withhold nuclear weapons use to conduct second-strikes in retaliation if attacked, while the latter implies that North Korea would be willing to launch nuclear first-strikes.
North Korea’s choice of nuclear strategy matters for a number of larger questions, like where its nuclear weapons are likely to be located, why it wields nuclear weapons, and how it’s likely to do so. But no matter what type of nuclear strategy North Korea chooses, it’s the North Korean military, the Korean People’s Army (KPA), that would implement that strategy by developing a military campaign plan outlining what forces and weapons would be employed, as well as how those resources would be employed. In this respect, North Korea is no different than any other national military; modern warfare is sufficiently technical and complex that it’s practically impossible for civilian policymakers (who are often laymen in defense affairs) to generate and execute a military campaign. Modern militaries are technocracies.
Like all militaries, the KPA is likely to plan for military campaigns to achieve maximum operational effectiveness. Kim Jong-un can likely weigh in as he pleases to affect specific narrow decisions or issue strategic guidance (such as don’t launch nuclear weapons except on his order), but he can’t draft the plan himself. Given the large and diverse inventory of missiles it continues to refine and invest in, we might then expect that missiles will be relevant as a “force multiplier” in KPA operations.
Although anti-access operations are most often associated with China in U.S. security discourses, most of Asia’s militaries have been making capability investments and re-orienting doctrine to emphasize blunting the power projection capabilities of others.
