National Defense University Press
Consider this possible scenario: A rogue nation threatens to fire ballistic missiles at the United States and its regional allies. In response, a forward-deployed U.S. Army radar transitions to high alert and continually scans the stratosphere, intending to detect and track the adversary’s ballistic missiles. U.S. Navy and partner nation Aegis ships armed with missile interceptors depart their home ports and steam toward prearranged operating areas. Meanwhile on land, missile defense convoys disperse near air and sea bases, activate their radars, and raise their launchers skyward. At multiple operations centers, Airmen plan attack operations against the enemy’s command and control and missile defense units. These joint missile defense movements require a sophisticated response, but what should the mechanism be to socialize, synchronize, and recommend these actions within a geographic combatant command? The answer: that mechanism would include inputs from the land, maritime, and air commanders (along with supporting agencies), yet present a holistic, inclusive, and effective missile defense response from the joint force commander.
Planning and executing a layered missile defense using the assets mentioned in the scenario requires coordination and integration among the land, maritime, and air components as well as subunified and regional missile defense partners. Not surprisingly, these resources for integrated air and missile defense will continue to be limited, as recognized by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense: Vision 2020.1 Missile defense systems are complex, expensive, and limited in number, and the lack of affordable interceptors gives potential adversaries a cost advantage as it is cheaper and easier to launch ballistic missiles than to successfully intercept them. Navy Aegis ships, the Army Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, and Patriot PAC-3 systems have proven and impressive intercept records.2 Yet these systems are finite in number, cost millions of dollars, and are in high demand across the combatant command’s (CCMD’s) area of responsibility (AOR). In short, integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) is an inherently joint and increasingly multinational and cross-CCMD mission area. How the geographic combatant commander or joint force commander (JFC) orchestrates these multi-Service and international missile defense operations requires a joint mechanism that is responsive and linked to the CCMD’s battle rhythm.
One solution is to operationalize the CCMD staff through the Board, Bureau, Center, Cells Working Group (B2C2WG) process with a dedicated and collaborative air and missile defense board—akin to the well-known and practiced joint targeting coordination board or the joint collection management board. A missile defense coordination forum does not exist in joint doctrine, yet a joint theater air and missile defense (JTAMD) board, fed by a supporting JTAMD working group, could provide the much needed joint IAMD planning and coordination support capability to the theater area air defense commander (AADC) and the joint force commander…
