Dear Members and Friends,

A week ago, the United States and Romania-in an underplayed and discreet manner-announced the initial technical operations of the U.S. funded, built, manned and commanded Aegis Ashore Missile Defense site in Deveselu, Romania. This announcement signified a major moment in President Obama’s legacy and his heralded European Phased Adapted Approach and is a major technical and political achievement for the United States in leadership of NATO. Unilateral U.S. financial support is in the billions for the two EPAA phases deployed today, which provide initial protection for the southeast part of Europe with a capability to track, discriminate and defeat medium range missiles into Romania, Bulgaria and Greece, the gateway of Europe from ballistic trajectories from Iran. In 2018, phase three of President Obama’s EPAA will complete the missile defense coverage of Central and Western Europe with a similar Aegis Ashore site operating in Redzikowo, Poland, which will be equipped with new longer range SM-3 Block IIA interceptor missiles. Phase four of President Obama’s EPAA-scheduled to be carried out in 2020-was canceled in 2013, but was intended to coincide with the deployment of much more capable SM-3 Block IIB interceptors, which would be fielded by the Aegis Ashore site in Poland and provide missile defense for the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States from Iranian ICBMs.

The accumulation of U.S. assets leading up to the operationalization of Aegis Ashore in Romania-marking completion of phase two of EPAA-required a sizable unilateral investment of billions of U.S. tax dollars and remarkable U.S. leadership to unify the 28 NATO countries and garner support for the deployment of American-made missile defenses for Europe. The collective resolve and vision to be ahead of the Iranian ballistic missile threat to Europe-that is repeatedly defying United Nations Resolutions and the intent of the Iran Nuclear Deal by its continual testing of its ballistic missiles-is commended. As a clear, invested, and collective deterrent to Iran and its ballistic missile development, it is of great concern that the White House, the NATO Secretary General, and the Supreme Allied Commander are not out front and leading publicly in the strategic messaging of this significant achievement, which will certainly be one of President Obama’s legacies.

This understated announcement has pre-empted the U.S. President’s upcoming NATO summit in Warsaw, Poland on July 8 and 9 and reduces the significance of EPAA in cautious trepidation of a Russian response. A calculated decision during the Summit announcing the transfer of U.S. Command and Control of phase 2 of the EPAA to NATO will be likely be understated in sensitivity towards Russia. Underplaying the strategic message of operation of Aegis Ashore in Romania undercuts the strategic purpose of the EPAA. If President Obama’s eight-year investment into EPAA is not addressed and proclaimed correctly for the European defense from Iran, then this legacy could be misconstrued as providing a “base camp” in Eastern Europe for future expansion of U.S. presence and force.

Inflaming this lack of strategic communication and clairvoyant policy is the upcoming U.S. presidential election and candidates with potential new polices towards NATO to enforce defense spending, greater concern to provide integrated air and missile defense against threats to NATO besides Iran, and the need for missile defense protection of the East Coast of the United States from the existing and established billions of investment in EPAA by re looking  at the possibility of adding more mature GBIs to the existing  site in Poland in 2020. With Russian challenges to NATO air superiority and a lack of adequate air defenses for maneuvering NATO forces in close proximity to the Baltic States in Northern Poland, the upcoming Aegis Ashore site in Poland could be considered and upgraded to perform those missions which the system does inherently already on all of the U.S. Aegis BMD-capable destroyers and cruisers.

Playing around and down to the American public of having the expensive phase 2 EPAA capability deployed today protecting Romania, Bulgaria and Greek citizens, but choosing to not operationalize that capability in Hawaii for the protection of 1.4 million Americans against a much more formidable and clear threat of North Korean nuclear ballistic missiles is irresponsible and accepts unnecessary risk to placate Russia.

Yesterday, the United States successfully tested its Aegis Ashore Site at the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) in Kauai, Hawaii with a forward-deployed X-band radar-TPY-2-at PMRF that is exactly the same as TYP-2 in Turkey today, which is operational with the Aegis Ashore Site in Romania. Both the sensor (the TYP-2) and the shooter (Aegis Ashore Site) are deployed in PMRF today that could provide some capability and a second shot opportunity in the terminal phase that Hawaii does not currently possess.

In the United States Congress, the House of Representatives and its House Armed Services Committee has recognized this error of judgement by the Obama administration in addressing the capabilities of Aegis Ashore, and have put forward requests in language inside the NDAA bill for 2017. Here are two markups on this bill:

• Maximizing Aegis Ashore Capability (Section 1654).
• Rep. Tulsi Gabbard: Ensuring Robust Missile Defense for Hawaii (Title XVI–Strategic Programs, Cyber, and Intelligence Matters).

If the operational initiation of EPAA phase two with NATO is not communicated correctly and effectively and Aegis Ashore in Hawaii is not operationalized, President Obama’s EPAA and his Missile Defense legacy will be viewed by history as an appeasement to Russia while inadvertently providing a base camp and foundation for U.S. anti-access area-denial capabilities for the next U.S. President against Russia in Eastern Europe.