Missile Defense is embedded within our strategic nuclear deterrence as stated by the Secretary of Defense yesterday on September 27, 2016.

The U.S. Secretary of Defense, Ash Carter from Minot Air Force Base, home of the U.S. strategic nuclear bombers and nuclear ICBM force:

“That’s important, because in today’s security environment – one that’s dramatically different from the last generation, and certainly the generation before that – we face a nuclear landscape that continues to pose challenges, and that continues to evolve – in some ways less predictably than during the Cold War – even though many around the world, and even some in the United States, are stuck in the Cold War in their thinking.

One way the nuclear landscape has changed: we didn’t build new types of nuclear weapons or delivery systems for the last 25 years, but others did.  At the same time, in another part of the landscape, our allies in Asia, the Middle East, and NATO did not.  And so we must continue to sustain our deterrence.

Now, Russia has long been a nuclear power, but Moscow’s recent saber-rattling and building of new nuclear weapons systems raises serious questions about its leader’s commitment to strategic stability, their regard for long-established abhorrence of using nuclear weapons, and whether they respect the profound caution that Cold War-era leaders showed with respect to brandishing nuclear weapons.

Meanwhile, North Korea’s nuclear and missile provocations underscore that a diverse and dynamic spectrum of nuclear threats still exists.  So our deterrence must be credible, and extended to our allies in the region.  It starts with the umbrella of deterrence you provide from Minot, supporting conventional forces like our air assets and our troops standing guard 24/7 on the Korean Peninsula to deter attack against our allies. It’s also why we continue to build more robust ballistic missile defenses oriented toward the North Korean threat – deploying Ground-Based Interceptors in Alaska and California, and also agreeing with our Korean allies to deploy the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system, or THAAD, in the Republic of Korea. And we back all of that up with the commitment that any attack on America or our allies will not only be defeated, but that any use of nuclear weapons will be met with an overwhelming and effective response.

Now, despite what has changed since the end of the Cold War, the nature of nuclear deterrence has not changed. Even in 2016, deterrence still depends on perception – what potential adversaries see, and therefore believe, about our will and ability to act.  This means that as their perceptions shift, so must our strategy and our actions.  Indeed, how we deter cannot be static; rather, it must adapt as threats evolve, while continuing to preserve strategic stability – reinforcing nuclear restraint, rather than inviting competition or attack. That’s important, because it illustrates how strong deterrence doesn’t lower the threshold for nuclear war – instead, it raises it.

Today, however, it’s a sobering fact that the most likely use of nuclear weapons is not the massive ‘nuclear exchange’ of the classic Cold War-type, but rather the unwise resort to smaller but still unprecedentedly terrible attacks, for example by Russia or North Korea, to try to coerce a conventionally superior opponent to back off or abandon an ally during a crisis. We cannot allow that to happen, which is why we’re working with our allies in both regions to innovate and operate in new ways that sustain deterrence, and continue to preserve strategic stability. “

–Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, September 26, 2016

Today, as the Secretary of Defense stated, it is apparent and evident that missile defense reinforces the deterrent capacity of our strategic forces as they are and modernized for our umbrella of deterrence; helping to reassure our allies and prevent their acquisition of nuclear weapons. Together, an offensive- and defensive-oriented deterrence is the most effective method for providing strategic stability, reinforcing nuclear restraint and increasing the threshold for nuclear war.

It is of merit that the United States and Russia have moved to decrease their strategic nuclear forces since the U.S. withdraw of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Treaty in 2002.