North Korea’s unwarranted attention caused by provocation, unwavering intent, unpredictable leadership and unknown capability has brought forth a credible nuclear capability deliverable by long range ballistic missiles to the Pacific and the United States of America. It is by far the single greatest threat posed by a rogue nation with a weapon of mass destruction capability with intentions to threaten the United States. To further validate this intention, U.S. and Japanese sources reported today that Pyongyang was planning a long range missile launch that could happen as early as next week.
The United States continues to develop, test and deploy a defensive architecture of ground based interceptors (GBI) and sensors in space, air, sea and land around the Pacific that are all fused together to provide the best assurance of success in intercepting long range ballistic missiles. The Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, made up of 30 GBIs, is the only tested and proven capability deployed today to defend the United States against long range ballistic missiles from North Korea.
The majority of these 30 GBIs are newer second generation Capability Enhancement-II (CE-II) interceptors and the remaining are first generation CE-I interceptors. Just a few of these interceptors are deployed in California at Vandenberg AFB, which has a maximum capacity of four silos. This site provides the shortest distance and best shot angle for the defense of Hawaii from North Korean ballistic missiles over the remaining majority of GBIs deployed in Alaska at Fort Greely. The GBI site in California also provides an additional layer of defense for the western United States and major cities on the coast below Alaska as well as different shot scenarios for more flexibility of the GMD system architecture in whole. In addition to its primary mission of defending the U.S., the California GBI site in Vandenberg is also dedicated to carrying out flight tests of the GBIs.
Due to lessons learned through the intercept testing of the first generation CE-Is, it was discovered that in space, vibrations caused by the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) divert thrusters could create disorientation of the initial measuring unit (IMU) inside the EKV that told it where in space it was, thus making the interceptor less reliable than it could be. To solve the engineering problem the IMU was put in a cradle with software to negate the vibration on a CE-II. This solution was proven in the most recent GBI tests culminating with a successful intercept in June of 2014. To further reduce the risk from space vibration on the EKV and to continue to increase its reliability, the CE-II EKV was engineered to include a new design of the EKV rocket thrusters to address the root cause of the vibrations. The upcoming GBI test will prove out this engineering concept which will be coupled with the cradle of the IMU to eliminate the risk of disorientation by vibration of the EKV.
Today the shot doctrine, or number of GBIs launched at one incoming long range ballistic missile to ensure success, would be a high number prior to proving out these EKV CE-II engineering solutions. To increase confidence and reliability of a the limited number of GBIs in place today, which includes 30 currently deployed with plans increase to 44 by the end of 2017, it is in the best interest of the national security of the nation to reduce the shot doctrine and to increase the capacity of GBIs against the growing North Korean threat. Reducing the shot doctrine of the GBI is directly dependent on making the interceptor more reliable and by enabling it to accurately discriminate the correct target amongst an expanding debris cloud that includes decoys and countermeasures of incoming ballistic missiles traveling through space.
To best increase the capacity of the limited GMD System, in addition to lowering the shot doctrine, and additional solution to best defend against the growing North Korean threat would be to add a field of ten additional GBI silos to the existing four silos at Vandenberg Air Force Base. This would increase the 44 GBIs planned for 2017 to a total of 54 deployed by 2018. Even with an upcoming Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) for the third generation GBI and the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) to be deployed in Alaska by 2020 that would significantly reduce the current shot doctrine, the nation would still need to have additional GBIs for its best protection against North Korea. At the very best case scenario over the next four years of having a conservative shot doctrine, having two thirds of the 54 GBIs in readiness and no long range ballistic missile threat from Iran materializing, a 54 GBI inventory would enable the U.S. to adequately defend its nation and people against the growing nuclear ballistic missile threat from North Korea.
Are we as a nation with the consistent actions of intent and capability of North Korea in its proliferation of nuclear and ballistic missile technology willing to risk not having a resounding ballistic missile defense capability to defend ourselves?
The GMD system is our only defense today deployed to defeat and defend against North Korean ballistic missiles. We need to increase the capacity of GMD by adding an additional ten interceptors.
