CNN brought national and world attention the demands on U.S. to Missile Defense assets – the existing challenges and continual growing demands and expectations on America’s front line of missile defense. The report detailed the strain placed on the Army’s air defense branch, operating “with almost 60% of its total force deployed at any one time” and described as “among the most overworked in the US military”. This is compared to over 85% of the active duty Armed Forces located within the United States and territories.
Overworked and underappreciated, deployed across six continents and spread throughout all 24 time zones, the domain which our air defense Soldiers defend is unparalleled. Despite offering retention bonuses regularly over $40,000, it is clear the Army is having a difficult time retaining these talented troops. While CNN has brought attention to the issue, which is unquestionably warranted, the incredible demand on soldiers, families, and even equipment is not new. The high demand and low density of air defense artillery formations has been the ‘norm’ over the last 10-15 years.
While new service initiatives have been introduced to try and reduce burnout across air defense units, the report highlights growing concerns that more substantive investments are required to be made to tackle the capacity and capability shortages at the root of the challenge. As one Army Sergeant put it, “it’s simple, pure math. We have more missions than we have air defense capability”. The question is raised, can and should Army air defenders be the primary line of defense of US air bases and embassies? The answer may be difficult to comprehend for some, but it’s clear to air defenders that something must change.
The consequences of our capacity and capability shortages go well beyond the burnout and hardship felt by service members and their families. The current deficiencies fundamentally undermine the preparedness of our forces overseas and threaten the training, resources, and readiness of our air and missile defense forces as a deterrent against adversaries worldwide. This has clearly been unsuccessful by senior leadership to make necessary change, and to do so in a timely manner. The argument of bureaucracy and defense management timeline requirements are a broken record and a flimsy excuse.
Nowhere are these challenges more clear, and the need to ramp up missile defense assets more urgent, than in the Indo-Pacific. The battle for the future of the free world is currently being contested across the shores of the Pacific, where the ability to project American power has never been more critical to deterring the authoritarian behavior of countries like China and North Korea. It is expected that in 2023 alone, the U.S. Army Pacific will participate in 24 exercises with allies throughout the region — building much needed partner readiness and capacity in the event of conflict in the Pacific. As demand for further exercise participation with partner nations continues to grow, critical missile defense units remain stretched dangerously thin.
For much of the Army Air Defense branch’s recent history, it was seen as an afterthought to the rest of the maneuver force mainly due to its perceived lack of utility during the 20-years of counterinsurgency operations across the Middle East. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine, though, has reminded us all of the utility of air defense to conflicts with peer adversaries. The U.S. Army must develop and field a missile defense capability, both Soldiers and equipment, to support major military combat operations and defend critical nodes such as air bases, sea ports, and logistics hubs.
During the first 500 days of the Ukraine-Russia conflict, a staggering number of 6,100 missiles have been launched from Russia, Belarus, and the Black Sea, targeting military formations, power generation infrastructure locations, and the indiscriminate targeting of civilian populated areas of Ukraine. With relentless imagery of destruction and devastation flooding television screens on a nightly basis, the American public finds itself contemplating the ruins of apartment buildings, targeted by Russian 9K270 Iskander and KH-101 missiles.
Often discussed are the delays in modernization efforts, waiting for a new cruise missile defense platform, or full implementation of IBCS. What the CNN report correctly highlights is that both Air defense battalions and individual Soldiers feel they are spread too thin. Over the last 15 years, the air defense branch has been the most deployed branch in the Army, with dwell times as low as 18 months at home to 12 months deployed. While dwell times have improved slightly, the training and deployment readiness requirements remain unchanged. It was not uncommon for soldiers to redeploy home after a nine or twelve month deployment, only to transfer to another unit preparing to deploy.
Just as concerning, though, is the lack of cruise and ballistic missile defense capability the U.S. Army has forward stationed in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. is not sufficiently postured to defend it forward air bases and logistics sites in Europe, Guam or Japan. While some of the causes have been financial challenges in the Army, much of it has been the Army’s decades long mismanagement of the development of the next generation of cruise missile defense systems – IFPC. And it is not an impossible task – over the same period the U.S. Navy has successfully developed cruise missile defense systems to protect maritime targets – it may be rocket science but the challenge was not unsolvable.
A recent independent study conducted at the behest of the Deputy Secretary of Defense on the roles and responsibilities of the DoD relating to missile defense underscored the urgency of the reorganization. The report calls for, “immediate decisive action to be taken to enhance a more integrated MD… substantially revamped unification of efforts and coordination across the enterprise”, noting that the growing threat environment has provided “DoD the opportunity to move forward to build a new architecture to address future gaps”.
It is time for a fundamental review of the Department of Defense’s roles and responsibilities for integrated air and missile defense; the Army has had its opportunity and be it task saturation or leadership decision making, they are failing. DoD needs to figure out how to best utilize existing forces and legacy equipment in the near term while simultaneously accelerating the acquisition process to field new systems capable of integrating and defeating an ever-evolving adversary. DoD and our nation requires to readdress Roles and Responsibilities of Integrated Air and Missile Defense.
