The Golden Dome executive order seeks to establish a next-generation missile defense shield, protecting the American homeland from ballistic, hypersonic, and advanced aerial threats. As the missile defense community races to innovate, a pivotal question arises: Can the U.S. leverage its existing Aegis-equipped warships to forge this protective dome?
THE AEGIS ADVANTAGE
Aegis warships have a long history of success. Developed in the 1970s, and rapidly enhanced after the 2002 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty exit, they have a stellar missile defense record in tests and live combat. Over the last two decades, US ships have been assigned to defend land across the globe against ballistic missiles, including defense of Israel, Guam, Europe, Japan, and Hawaii. Europe has already bought off on the effectiveness of Aegis through the Aegis Ashore program, protecting European countries from long-range attacks. Japan, Australia, Norway, Spain, and South Korea have all invested in Aegis ships themselves. With over 50[i] ballistic missile defense (BMD)-capable Aegis warships, the U.S. Navy could deploy mobile sensors and interceptors along both coasts to provide the core of the Golden Dome.
Aegis warships are popular for a reason – they are powerhouses of integrated air and missile defense (IAMD). Equipped with SPY radars and SM-3 and SM-6 missiles, these ships engage ballistic threats in the midcourse and terminal phases, extending intercept ranges further away from population centers. In case of attack, their stealth and mobility complicates adversary targeting and increases survivability. Their speed also allows them to intercept multi-axis threats from multiple adversaries, enabling less assets to achieve the mission than more fixed and trajectory-specific land-based systems. Aegis baselines are built for simultaneous engagements of UAVs, manned aircraft, and advanced missiles. Once given permission, the weapon system plans, prioritizes and executes these engagements at breakneck speeds, with optional human feedback. If adjustments are needed, Aegis open system architecture allows for over-the-air updates—a huge battlefield advantage.
Aegis ships thrive in a joint, networked environment. Their current inclusion in the Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) network enables them to share data with Space Force, Army, and other Navy assets to provide ballistic missile defense-in-depth (more than one engagement opportunity on each threat). Cooperative Engagement Capability is another tool to enable 360-degree IAMD, effectively meshing airborne and surface sensors together to provide a clear, engagement-quality surveillance picture. These networks make Aegis warships uniquely qualified to both lead and perform Golden Dome duties in a joint environment against a diverse threat set.
LIMITATIONS OF ALTERNATIVES
As we’ve seen in Israel and Ukraine, Aegis ships are not the only US BMD asset that could make up the Golden Dome. However, the other options’ current limited availability, when added to their system disadvantages make them a difficult short-term choice.
Army Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) and Patriot Systems are also battle-proven, but engage in the terminal phase only. Even with their latest upgrades, as point-defense systems they lack the range and scale to shield a nation 450 times larger than Israel. This has been proven in the execution of Guam defense: a single 200-square-mile island requires multiple Patriot batteries, a THAAD battery, and most recently TPY-6 land-based radars with land-based SM-3s[ii] to sufficiently protect it. There are only seven total existing US THAAD batteries[iii]. More systems would have to be rapidly built and the amount of defendable US homeland substantially reduced if solely relying on current Army technology to form the Golden Dome.
Aegis Ashore offers critical early detection and intercept options via SPY radar and SM-3, but remains immobile—a glaring vulnerability. Only three sites currently exist in Poland, Romania, and Hawaii. More sites would be needed to provide a land-based dome of defense. The Navy currently mans these sites; without a recruitment surge in selective enlisted fire control rates, each additional Aegis Ashore site takes away capability from the fleet.
AEGIS CRITICAL CHALLENGE: COST AND CAPACITY
It is clear that Aegis ships can be a steadfast backbone to the Golden Dome. The real question is, should they?
Aegis ships are extremely resource-intensive. Each Aegis warship costs $2.5 billion to construct[iv], $81 million annually to operate[v], and years to get from the design stage to underway. Scaling the US Aegis fleet for continuous nationwide IAMD coverage risks financial overload, if even possible due to U.S. shipbuilding constraints. Alternative existing options are cheaper and faster to build and operate.
Aegis ships have limited endurance. Warships excel against smaller strikes but could be overwhelmed by mass salvos or decoys due to limited interceptor reload ability. Coastal coverage spanning 12,000+ miles demands land, aerial, and space-based sensors to close gaps, even for the SPY radar. Warships require constant fueling, food and maintenance while underway to maintain a 350-person crew. Other IAMD options require less manning and resources while on station.
Aegis ships have an enormous opportunity cost. Perhaps most importantly, repurposing multi-mission warships for Golden Dome duties would weaken global naval presence. Current use of Aegis ships for defense of land is controversial as it prevents ships from executing their built-in mission flexibility on a worldwide scale. Other initiatives such as anti-piracy and freedom of navigation operations will suffer if ships continue to be pulled into purely homeland IAMD roles.
Due to these issues, purpose-built missile defense assets like THAAD, Patriot, or Aegis Ashore offer some advantages over Aegis warships. Again, production of these units would need to rapidly accelerate to provide comparable short-term coverage to Aegis ships.
INTEGRATED DEFENSE AND INNOVATION
Aegis warships are capable today to be a cornerstone of the Golden Dome, but a multi-domain solution—merging sea, land, and space assets—is essential for longevity of the executive order.
The Strategic Defense Initiative faltered in the 1990s due to cost overruns. Over-reliance on current expensive, multi-mission Aegis ships risks a repeat—or sacrifices U.S. global reach without new vessels. Stationing our highly-capable fleet in a continuous watch off of our coasts is not a long-term solution.
For the Golden Dome to last, innovation is key to circumvent existing operational, monetary, and logistical limitations. New versions of proven “legacy” technology should not be ruled out. Much like Japan’s Aegis System Equipped Vessel (ASEV), an IAMD-only Aegis combat system could be used in novel ways on cheaper, smaller or autonomous vessels. A miniaturized version could be used in space. Directed energy, non-kinetic effects, and cyber options should not be overlooked.
Overall, robust sensor networks and deep, layered interceptor inventories are needed to counter evolving threats. Rapid construction of current IAMD technology could provide the short-term solution. The Department of Defense must add cost-effective, interoperable emerging technologies to our arsenal to ensure this shield rises swiftly and endures.
The Golden Dome is a bold step to secure America’s future. Stay informed—our nation’s defense depends on it.
By Kristen Damico, MDAA RADM Kathleen K. Paige Fellow
[i] O’Rourke, Ronald. (2024, July 15). Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress. (CRS Report No. RL33745). https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33745/253
[ii] Kohler, Chase. “Global Reach Combined Test Force Supports Historic Ballistic Missile Intercept in Guam.” Air Force Materiel Command, 412th Test Wing Public Affairs, 7 Jan. 2025, www.afmc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/4023936/global-reach-combined-test-force-supports-historic-ballistic-missile-intercept/.
[iii] Ennis, Hannah D. (2024, December 30). Defense Primer: U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense. (CRS Report No. IF10541). https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10541.
[iv] O’Rourke, Ronald. (2024, December 16). Navy DDG-51 and DDG 1000 destroyer programs: Background and issues for Congress December 16th, 2024. (CRS Report No. RL32109). https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32109.
[v] Rogoway, Thomas Newdick and Tyler. “Navy’s ‘cheap’ Littoral Combat Ships Cost Nearly as Much to Run as Guided Missile Destroyers.” The War Zone, The War Zone, 12 Apr. 2021, www.twz.com/40147/littoral-combat-ships-cost-nearly-as-much-to-run-as-guided-missile-destroyers.
