Tal Inbar, NK Pro:
The unsuccessful launch attempt of a Musudan (AKA BM-25) missile by the DPRK on March 31 was the fourth failure to launch this missile this year – and a blow to Kim Jong Un’s pride. Since March, the North Korean regime has started to show to the world its missile achievements – at a staggering pace: Following its January “hydrogen” bomb test, there was the first peek into the nose cone of a Hwasong-13 (also known as a KN-08) intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a nuclear device inside; then a test of a large-diameter solid rocket motor, and a successful static test of twin liquid-fueled rocket engines, associated with the ICBM. Then came a successful launch of an SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile) – all in a period of about six weeks. On top of it all, the regime was ready to test-fire, for the first time, its elusive “Musudan” missile, first shown in the 2010 military parade in Pyongyang.
But then something went very wrong: the first-ever test of the Musudan took place on the 104th anniversary of the birthday of Kim Il Sung on April 15. South Korea said it deviated from a normal trajectory and the launch is presumed to have failed. The U.S. Strategic Command systems also “detected and tracked” the missile, also assessing that the launch failed.
After a very short time (in missile engineering terms) of 14 days, the DPRK gave the missile a second shot. On the early morning of April 28, the second missile was fired – with catastrophic results: The explosion, mere seconds after liftoff, destroyed the TEL (transporter-erector-launcher) along with the missile. Rocket science is hard, and there is no room for mistakes. If 14 days between the first launch attempt and the second seems like a short time to analyze the reasons for the failure and fix the problems, the DPRK had already, on the eve before the second missile exploded, made the decision to try and launch yet another missile. This is something unheard of and, for an outsider, looks like an emotional decision, not a rational one. It was a gamble, and the bet did not pay off: The third Musudan also failed.
The damage to North Korea was not just bad PR, but genuine doubts about the credibility of the threat from this missile
One can only try to imagine the immense pressure on the engineers and the military personnel responsible for the failed launches. The reputation of Kim is not that of a forgiving ruler, especially after three consecutive failures. The damage to North Korea was not just bad PR, but genuine doubts about the credibility of the threat from this missile. There is no consensus on this among the community of North Korea researchers – some had stated for years that this missile is not a real one, and published speculative technical analysis of it. Every failure seems to make their point stronger.
