For the first time in a decade, international sanctions have a decent chance of affecting the regime. On March 2 the United Nations Security Council responded to the North’s fourth nuclear test by passing Resolution 2270, which bans the importation of North Korean coal and minerals. It tightens controls on financial transactions, and it blacklists certain cargo ships from entering foreign ports.
The sanctions are still limited, since they don’t include shipments of oil from China that are the regime’s most important lifeline. Beijing and Moscow insisted on loopholes, and traders continue to smuggle goods across the Chinese border. The shipping blacklist is incomplete and poorly enforced.
But the sanctions should reduce the foreign earnings Pyongyang needs to buy imported essentials such as oil. South Korea’s closure of the Kaesong Industrial Zone last year has also deprived the North of about $100 million a year. Most important, China seems to be enforcing sanctions for the first time. Some 90% of the North’s trade is with China, so Beijing has always held the key to reining in Pyongyang’s nuclear program. Beijing has issued new regulations to enforce the U.N. resolution, and traders report that customs authorities are inspecting shipments.
What has changed? One answer is South Korea’s new diplomatic fortitude. Seoul has made China’s support for the Kim regime a major issue in the bilateral relationship, and South Korea defied Beijing by deciding to deploy a U.S. high-altitude missile-defense system.
