Amongst the fray and noise of statements from the North Korean Workers’ Party Congress (link to article), conflicting reports of a 2,000 km Iranian ballistic missile launch (link to article), and the USS William P Lawrence sailing within 12 nautical miles of the Fiery Cross Reef (link to article), is the quiet but aggressive Russian buildup around NATO and the Baltic States. There is potential for an increasingly aggressive Russia to regain its influence in Eastern Europe and take advantage of an outgoing U.S. President, the upcoming U.S. general election, and a significant reduction of NATO capability after decades of unwillingness and neglect by a majority of NATO countries to reach their obligated defense spending targets.

Russia has certainly caught the attention of the United States Army. In 2014, Moscow demonstrated a new type of 21^st century warfare prior to and during its annexation of Crimea, when the Russian military employed “indirect” FIRES—consisting of electromagnetic radiation and cyber capabilities—followed by directed FIRES, or the deployment of troops and equipment into Ukraine. Russia’s employment of this new type of warfare was a key topic last week in Fort Sill, Oklahoma where the United States Army Artillery Branch and the Army Air Defense Branch, together called FIRES, held their annual conference with guest speakers General Daniel B. Allyn, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, Lieutenant General Patrick J. Donahue II, the Deputy Commanding General for U.S. Army Forces Command, and Major General Stephen G. Fogarty, the new Cyber Center of Excellence Commanding General.

The emergence of a limited, near peer Russian threat to the United States and NATO is causing a shift in U.S. strategic policy, which is moving away from “assurance” of our NATO allies towards a strategy of “deterrence” against Russia. This new strategy will revisit concepts from the 1980s and require constant exercises in speed of recognition, decision making, and increasing capabilities to counter the Russian threat. There are mismatches and gaps in NATO’s current deterrent capability and the U.S. military’s force readiness must be addressed in Europe and in FORSCOM in the United States. With NATO air superiority being challenged and contested by Russian anti-access capabilities in the Baltics and Eastern Europe, along with its display of long distance cruise missiles and air fueling within European airspace, the U.S. Army and NATO ground forces must maintain credible deterrence while preserving peace and stability. This requires ground maneuvering forces from division to brigade combat teams that will have to defend against air breathing threats, a capability that is no longer in doctrine or existence with these large scale forces, largely because of a lack of credible threats to U.S. air superiority over the last few decades. A lack of Air Defense against 21^st century UAVs, cruise missiles, and fixed and rotary aircraft—either over sea or land—is a critical vulnerability that must be addressed by NATO and the United States in order to effectively deter the threat posed by Russia.

The United States Army’s “Total Force” made up of 187,000 Soldiers deployed in 140 countries currently includes 25,000 National Guard soldiers. The United States National Guard retains 7 Avenger (Air Defense) Battalions which has the NASAMS (National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System) interceptors used in rotation for the Air Defense of the National Capital Region in Washington D.C. This year for the first time, the Ohio National Guard will be deploying their Avenger Battalion into NATO Eastern Europe for exercises. Occurring in fall, this will show some 18 NATO participating countries performing an Air Defense exercises in Eastern Europe. Germany leads Europe with a single deployable Air Defense battalion, yet, the Netherlands deploys only one Air Defense Unit and the United States has no operational or deployed Air Defense units or battalions in Europe.

To begin to cope with this wide cap, the United States Air Defense Artillery Branch and school house are introducing a conceptual design for a mobile Multiple Launch Platform (MLP) that will be a second phase or generation off of their not yet developed Indirect Fire Protection Capability Increment (IFPC) which will replace the Counter Rocket and Mortar (CRAM) for forward base protection deployed today in Afghanistan and Iraq. Research and development is focusing on a ground-mobile solid-state laser and a mobile electrical railgun, but these systems will not be deployed anytime soon. New ideas and new approaches from past, current and future Air Defense capabilities will need to be fully embraced by the maneuvering force of the Army to be effective both in mission and cost.

The United States Army is in a constrained and reduced budget environment and will be required to reduce its forces by 40,000. Moving forward, the U.S. Army will look to three objectives to sustain its readiness and all of its missions globally, one of which will involve Air Defense.

1. Leadership development of inspired soldiers that can do more with less.
2. Acquisition Reform to gain the very most for every dollar spent.
3. Divest in obsolete programs, of which there are approximately 750 in existence.

The United States Military must create interoperability between its capabilities and that of its NATO Allies. The objective of this is to force multiply and reduce the burden and unevenly shared responsibility of European defense that has fallen primarily on the United States. With respect to Integrated Air and Missile Defense, the following initiatives should be implemented:

1. A Center of Excellence for Integrated Air and Missile Defense for NATO needs to be established in Germany.
2. A rotating General Officer for NATO Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) of Europe needs to be established.
3. A composite NATO Air Defense Force needs to be created and exercised with true interoperability.
4. A composite NATO Air and Ballistic Missile Defense Force needs to be created and exercised with true interoperability.
5. NATO members that are invested in air and Missile Defense need to pay their fair share of 2 % of their GNP for Defense.

To deter in the end game, you must be able to show you can win. In the context of miss-matches and contested air space, General Allyn said it best, “We still have to punch you in the Nose and Sweep around your Back.”