The Japan News
Japan should work closely with the United States and South Korea and strategically strengthen its defense posture to unerringly deal with North Korea’s missile launches.
Before Pyongyang launched a long-range ballistic missile on Feb. 7, Defense Minister Gen Nakatani ordered the Self-Defense Forces to intercept and destroy the missile if it threatened to fall within Japanese territory. Three Aegis destroyers equipped with SM-3 interceptor missiles were stationed in waters near Japan, and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) surface-to-air guided missile units were deployed in seven locations including Okinawa Prefecture.
Were there any faults in this two-tier interception system? Verifying this is essential.
Given that North Korea is steadily improving its technological capability by repeatedly launching missiles, it is necessary to further improve the SDF’s interception ability.
To begin with, the plan to increase the number of Aegis destroyers equipped with the advanced missile defense system from the current four to eight in fiscal 2020 must be steadily implemented.
We also want the next-generation SM-3 missile being jointly developed by Japan and the United States to be quickly completed and deployed. The new missile has a longer range than the SM-3, which would mean two Aegis destroyers equipped with the interceptors could protect all of Japan, rather than the three currently needed. The new missile also will be significantly more accurate in making interceptions.
In the future, the introduction of cutting-edge equipment with even higher capabilities will become an issue to be addressed.
On the issue of whether Japan might one day possess the U.S. military’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga said the government will “study the issue and speed up deliberations on it.”
The THAAD system is said to cost a great deal of money. It is important to continue research into whether the system is cost-effective and compatible with the equipment systems of the entire SDF.
Base strikes should be mulled
Cooperation with Washington and Seoul also is vital.
After North Korea’s latest launch, information about the missile gleaned by U.S. military’s early-warning satellites was swiftly conveyed to the SDF.
The “bilateral coordination mechanism” through which the SDF and the U.S. military discuss and coordinate their respective actions, a mechanism made permanent under the new Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Guidelines, appears to have functioned effectively. The mechanism’s effectiveness must be improved further by combining it with regular drills and training.
Signing a general security of military information agreement (GSOMIA) with South Korea is an urgent task. Concerned about a backlash in domestic public opinion, the South Korean government currently exchanges only information about North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs via the United States.
If Japan and South Korea became able to directly exchange information, both nations’ ability to respond to crises would improve remarkably. We urge South Korean President Park Geun-hye’s administration to make a firm decision to conclude this information-sharing agreement.
It is effectively impossible to prevent all missile attacks with only an interceptor system. We think it may be time to seriously consider whether Japan should have the ability to attack enemy bases, for instance, by possessing cruise missiles.
Under the Constitution, attacking an enemy base is considered possible provided the enemy nation has indicated it intends to fire a missile at Japan. The government should research what attack methods would be effective, on the premise that any such operation would be conducted jointly with the U.S. military.
