Forbes
It’s a long way from Paris to Pyongyang, but as the world ponders the jihadi attacks on France, let us not lose sight of the menace emanating on the other side of the globe from a nuclear-arming, weapons-vending North Korea. That, too, is a danger that has been growing on President Obama’s watch. The threats include not only North Korea’s program for making nuclear missiles with a range that could reach the United States, but the possibility that North Korean nuclear wares could end up in the hands of Islamic terrorists.
These perils will not be resolved by another set of nuclear talks with North Korea. With a parade of broken promises stretching back more than two decades, North Korea has mastered the art of extorting concessions at the bargaining table and walking away to continue its progress toward a nuclear arsenal. Nor does it augur well that United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon may be planning a trip to Pyongyang, as reported recently by South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency (though the U.N. as of this writing had refused to confirm or deny). Ban’s record of bringing peace to the world is a near-empty slate, and a visit from Ban would likely do more to legitimize and fortify North Korea’s totalitarian regime of Kim Jong Un than to disarm it.
For clearer thinking about how to grapple with North Korea, let us turn to some sage advice offered more than nine years ago, in June, 2006. North Korea was then in the final stages of fueling a long-range Taepodong ballistic missile for a test launch when two prominent American defense experts recommended a dramatic U.S. response. In a Washington Post Op-ed headlined “If Necessary, Strike and Destroy,” these two experts urged the Bush administration: “if North Korea persists in its launch preparations, the United States should immediately make clear its intention to strike and destroy the North Korean Taepodong missile before it can be launched.”
One of these experts was Ashton B. Carter, now President Obama’s secretary of defense. His coauthor, William J. Perry, had served as secretary of defense during the Clinton administration. In their article, they stressed that North Korea’s clear purpose in testing a long-range ballistic missile was to develop a delivery vehicle for nuclear bombs. They noted that there were risks to blowing up the missile on the launch pad. But they countered that “the risk of continuing inaction in the face of North Korea’s race to threaten this country would be greater…”
