Pause, Assess, Regroup, Missile Defense for America

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Mr. Riki Ellison, Chairman and Founder, Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance

Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen, from a nice sunny fall day here in the Washington DC area in Alexandria Virginia. I'm Ricky Ellison I'm the chairman and founder of the missile defense advocacy alliance, an organization that we built 20 years ago. The sole purpose is to advocate to educate for the development, the deployment, and evolution of our missile defenses to make our world a safer place.

Today's our 63rd virtual, it's a great one. It's on Pause, Assess, Regroup for Missile Defense for America. We have our guests that are on our board and we are spanning the globe today. We have Mark Montgomery who is in Odessa Ukraine live, we have John Rood who is in Silicon Valley in Santa Clara live, and we have JD Gainey in Hawaii live, and me here in Alexandria.

We're at a point in time over the past 40 years that I've been involved with missile defense, taking it back all the way to 1980, we have never seen, I never seen through eight presidents, the missile threat to this country as great as it is in the last 10 months. 10 months. You could start with the drone attack on Langley AFB that was out in the Wall Street Journal and that was three or four days maybe two weeks [ago] and we had our best equipment we had aerial capabilities, and we could not detect track or take those drones down. Then in January we had the whole episode of Chinese spy balloons going across our country, that happened. We then move into September where the Chinese launched an ICBM test that's the longest in the history of mankind; nobody not our ICBMs tested that we do went as far as they went from mainland China all the way into Tahiti waters on that. Then we're having thousands of drones a month crossing the Mexican border where the drug cartels are crossing into our airspace, White Sands Missile Range. Over the last four days in Alaska just four days in Alaska you've had two Russian aircraft a day crossing our space in Alaska. And we were just up there. We were up in Alaska on September 30th, and we walked through 20 vacant ground base interceptor silos that are unfilled for two years. We've got a degraded fleet that's getting older, and we struggle with this it. And now we have Congress, the military construction committee quoted saying \$60 billion we're spending on Guam for a miss defense architecture. How much money are we spending for Alaska or California or Hawaii or the United States of America? We haven't solved the problem. We haven't solved the problem in capacity, in integrated defense for our Homeland. And we're watching the world today, we're watching deterrence fail for the security of nations. Ukraine couldn't deter or NATO couldn't deter Russia from using missiles drones hypersonic capabilities. We saw Iran strike April 13th and October 1st.

We have a problem and it really, no not really, it does not matter who the next president is. This is not political; this is about having an adequate defense for the population United States of America. Whether it's Guam, Hawaii, New York, or Arizona. We have not prioritized it, we have not addressed it, and we have not resourced it. That is a huge problem right now for everybody and we pay taxes for defense that's in our Constitution and we're not being defended across the spectrum I just mentioned and I would add hypersonic glide [threats] on top of that. So the discussion today is let's reset this thing, let's reassess this thing, let's look at what what's going on and how do we go forward, how do we prioritize the defense of this vast nation and our people the right way. I think the way to start this is with policy is in charge of this, to some extent. Policy has to be enabled to be properly give the authorities to the War Fighters and combatant commanders to fight this and to be able to give the War Fighters the ability to advocate for systems across the board that they need and required to defend this country. We're limited because the policy sometimes controls the funding.

So, I think that there's a lot of issues here but we're going to go through as much as we can in the next 50 minutes or so and we're going to start with policy. We've got the best policy expert we believe, in this area. John Rood has been involved with missile defense since early 2000 and he was former OSD policy under secretary and John's been a patriot been an advocate for missile defense since I've known him over the past 20 years. So ladies and gentlemen from Silicon Valley Mr. John Rood. John all yours.

Mr. John Rood, MDAA Board of Directors Member

Thank you Riki for that generous introduction. It's great to be with you all and it really is a pivotal moment that we are at I think. You know a lot of us are watching the preparation for the upcoming election and Riki's right it's not political, but we will have a new president in the United States, and we will have a new Administration very shortly. We're going to go through this interesting period that always happens after an election where a new president has been elected but is not yet the president and unfortunately we will go through a low point where people that are presently in the administration are looking for other opportunities that they are starting to attrit, their minds are not completely focused on the day-to-day, and the new administration's still forming up and remember it will take some months for new people to be nominated to be confirmed and unfortunately that process has become much slower and much more political and it will drag out, frankly it'll occupy the bulk of the first year that the new president is in office getting a team in place. So that's the challenge but we while we don't lack for challenges in this country fortunately, we do have a lot of benefits but we've got to be smart about this.

I think one of the things that I'm concerned about is, let's start with some fundamental points. Missile defense needs to be a high priority and we have to break away from some of these old mindsets about trying to subdivide the threat into ways that are convenient for us but that the adversary is not pursuing. We're not taking stock of what is truly occurring in the world, what is the state of the threat, and what is the adversary doing, and we need to credit our adversaries for being very inventive, very capable people on their own and respond accordingly.

You know I was reminded when I was preparing for this; there's an old Far Side cartoon for those that are fans of that where you know there's a group of cowboys surrounded and they circle the wagons as the cowboys did and then an a arrow arrives which is on fire and you know one of the cowboys remarks saying flaming arrows, they're not allowed to use flaming arrows, what the heck is going on. As though there are certain rules that you cannot do that to eliminate the wagon train and other things. Well, we're behaving similarly where our policy should be in my view, we are going to defend the United States Homeland and our deployed forces as well as allies with their cooperation to the extent they operate from missiles of all types, all ranges. And there's an artificial categorization that's going on right now where our adversaries are exploiting some of those themes. We've always thought, we've been blessed we have two oceans around the United States Mainland, and we've been blessed that we have not had wars in the US Territory but you're seeing people like China, with these drone penetrations around Langley Airbase, with the High Altitude Balloons, with a whole range of other things with operatives being deployed in US Territory or what's going on in cyberspace, not respecting those boundaries. Guess what, the arrows are sometimes being lit whether they're allowed to do it or not, they are doing this.

So we have to break free from that mindset and some of what I'm concerned about in the policy today is for example defend against some types of missiles launched at the United States from some people is allowed by the present administration's policy. Defense against other types, for example if a hypersonic missile is launched at the United States, the Commander of NORTHCOM has testified he is not authorized to defend against it. If the origin of that missile streaking towards New York City or some other large venue was not North Korea or Iran there are limitations placed on his ability to defend against those. That's not wise, that's not good policy. Whatever the origin, whether it's a flaming arrow or a regular arrow, we need to be able to defend the country and US citizens are entitled to that type of defense. So, while you can never have a uniform, 100% leak proof defense we do have to take more seriously the need to protect those people that are American citizens that just don't happen to be in the 48 contiguous states, they're in places like Alaska and Hawaii and Guam. So, fundamentally we got to defend against missiles of all ranges all types, all flights, and that was our policy in the previous administration but that has not been in the current one and that's what I think it ought to be going forward. Then secondly, we've got to recognize what's going on in places like Ukraine and Iran is not new in the sense that in places that receive less coverage like in Saudi Arabia and the UAE the Houthis have been attacking, with Iranian support, large concentrations, whether they be military, civilian, cities, the leaders of those countries, with large scale missile and drone attacks. The fact that it's now being applied in places that receive more press coverage in the United States, like in Israel, doesn't mean the threat has changed and we're not recognizing that missiles are a primary feature of warfare.

Unfortunately, the last couple of budgets from the present administration have called for a reduction in missile defense spending. Which, if you're watching what's going on in places like Ukraine and Israel in the fight our adversaries have invested very heavily in those capabilities and are using them and that's what's going on with China as well. So our policy needs to evolve there and we need to also be thinking well what are our vital national interest in the Pacific and elsewhere. We are a Pacific power, the United States has more Pacific Coast line than Atlantic Coastline, and that is where the world's largest concentration of economy and trade is taking place and we are very heavily dependent on that in the United States. So we need the ability to be able to trade

and move and operate freely and protect our people and our interests and that's where things like defense of Guam or having a forward basing location [is strategically important] and we cannot assume those things are not going to be under heavy missile, drone, and cruise missile attack or that the adversary is going to respect certain rules about the categorization of when and where and how they may attack. That's simply not been the lessons of warfare. And too many times dominant powers whether it's the British Empire or others like when the American colonists fought them assumed you know there are certain rules of warfare. Men should stand and be recognized and be easily shot and exchange each other, they should orderly gather on a battlefield to fight. Well, the adversary doesn't respect those rules, they use flaming arrows. So, here I think we need to do something very similar and we're going to have to protect some vital areas like Guam and elsewhere and it's very disappointing to see after several years that we have not achieved that despite combatant commanders and others pointing to the urgent operational needs. We're not making progress; we're not keeping pace with the threat. The pace of the threat has accelerated, and we have decelerated unfortunately.

So there's a real challenge here that we've got to come forward we have to prioritize this in our spending which will mean some other things will get less spending and missile defense needs to be accelerated. So just a few thoughts to set the table here. But you know one need only look at the latest news from Israel or Ukraine to be reminded if that was directed at us, I don't think we would fare as well. Which is you know not a positive commentary on our level of preparedness and the level of the sophistication of the adversary like China is dramatically higher.

We have to look ourselves in the face, take that challenge on, and despite the fact that the new administration whatever it is, is going to be short-handed, we're going to have to overcome that. This is a critical national security issue so just a few thoughts Riki.

Mr. Riki Ellison, Chairman and Founder, Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance

Thanks John. John can you explain the relationship with policy and resourcing because it seems like we have policy not allowed to do hypersonic strike on US Homeland, we have policy that restricts us from drones, we have policy from cruise missile [threats] and we end up policy blocking that or pushing that for other people's agenda to the mid-30s instead of dealing with it now. A lot of our stuff is being pushed now to the mid-30s when we'll have capability but that's 10 years away from now. Will you explain the politics of that please, on why we're not in sync.

Mr. John Rood, MDAA Board of Directors Member

Unfortunately, I think it does start with policy and leadership and at present I think there's some outdated thinking going on. Thinking that for example nuclear deterrence or the threat of overwhelming retaliation will prevent a missile attack and that's simply not supported by the facts of the last few decades. I mean this is provable, if you look at what the Iranians did for example with the Israelis, the Israelis are a nuclear armed state. So, the argument from that is outdated from the McNamara era goes, well who would dare attack a nuclear armed state with a missile attack on its leaders or its people in large scale because there would be an overwhelming retaliation through nuclear force. False, it's been tried and proven. This is not a fair or accurate statement and the fact that you can defend yourself does not undermine deterrence or strategic stability, it increases it. Witness the fact that Russia and China are either maintaining or deploying missile defenses to protect themselves and it has not led the United States to increase our level of nuclear offensive armaments. This is a false argument. So, we got to break free from that and that's unfortunately a handicap that some of our leaders still have from the Cold War. But even when you have a good policy which is I want to defend the American people against missile attack and our force is because we must and policy sets the priorities, defines well what do I care about in terms of threats, how do I rank order those and what character force do I want to have and what is its role. In this case protection of the American people comes first in the Homeland but secondly, you've got to have a view of the United States as a global power, meaning we do have interests in the Pacific that we want to protect and it is a vital interest of ours to have free trade, free movement, free access to things like the Pacific Ocean and crossing the so-called nine dash line that the Chinese Communist party wants to draw and restrict to itself. But inside that then, after policy sets the priorities and sets the strategy. It's a difficult and unwieldy beast, the defense establishment we have, because it's so large but you've got to have some discipline and execution just like you do in your days for a winning football team. Not everybody can go out for a pass at the same time, other people have to block, other people have to be the running backs, other people have to play defense.

So here policy sets the strategy and talks about the character of the force and the threat you face but then our war plans are built on what is that strategy and the programmers, people like CAPE, they're supposed to resource that plan and the acquisition people run the process by which things are acquired. They do not set the

budget priorities, they execute a very complex acquisition system and program managers implement that. We have roles and responsibilities set up for organizations like the missile defense agency and people have to play by those roles and they have to be held to account to execute. You can't simply say well gee I want someone else to play tight end or I want someone else to play wide receiver, if they can play it sure, but otherwise whoever's in that position is going to have to perform. And here uh we've got this odd lack of discipline I would say where you have people like programmers thinking they set policy or describe what the war plan should be as opposed to thinking my job is to resource these things and integrate across the department, the Army, Navy, Air Force, Space force, and other departments and agencies into a coherent systems engineering [unintelligible].

Mr. Riki Ellison, Chairman and Founder, Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance

John just be clear who directs policy? Is that the president, is that Congress, just to everybody who is the significant influencer on changing policy?

Mr. John Rood, MDAA Board of Directors Member

Well in the executive branch the president does and to a large extent under the Constitution the President has certain authorities whether it's as commander-in-chief or frankly to conduct a foreign policy affair the United States where the president plays the leading role in that. The Secretary of Defense manages the force but in many ways he's got to do that in collaboration with the Secretary of State and others. So what is the vision for what role the United States will play in the world. But within defense setting things like defense policy the Secretary of Defense does and his principal staff person and advisor and leader of the organization is the undersecretary of defense for policy. But on things such as what resources to apply, what systems to develop, the deputy secretary of defense is really the lynch pin and so you know if the undersecretary for policy and the deputy secretary have a good working relationship, and the system is running properly it really ought to be seamless. I'm not clear on how well that's working today.

Mr. Riki Ellison, Chairman and Founder, Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance

Why haven't we seen a change in policy with the threat that's out there, why?

Mr. John Rood, MDAA Board of Directors Member

I think one; there's this this hangover from the cold war of outdoor outdated thinking that missile defenses are in some way destabilizing. All I can say is the Israelis and the United States forces have defended against two very large-scale attacks from Iran and missile defense was certainly not destabilizing. Your honor I rest my case. If you want to hear further arguments, we can but you know that's pretty conclusive. But I think there is this outdated thinking, and I think there is also a reluctance to prioritize it above other defenses and there's also some outdated thinking, I love offensive strike capabilities that can provide precision and can attrite the enemy and can strike missiles on the ground and so-called shooting the archers not the arrows.

However, the practical reality is there's great limitations to that as a defense policy that are hard to accept, hard truths to accept, but the reality is witness what the Israelis are doing in Lebanon to Hezbollah today. Intense strikes. At one point, 15 hours of continuous heavy bombardment of Hezbollah. Hezbollah still launched, if memory serves, 170 missiles at Israel that day. Simply shooting the archers will not attrite the threat even with overmatch, tremendous application of force. We have to learn that lesson. What the US Navy is encountering with the Houthis there are political limitations where the present administration is very reluctant to strike the Houthis on a large scale or to attack their leaders or other things of that nature. And so you've got these Navy vessels given a very difficult Mission over a large area to defend international shipping and shipping that's vital to the United States economy but they're doing it at the tail end. So we have to accept these realities and resource for it and that takes tough decisions about what to prioritize and where to spend money.

Mr. Riki Ellison, Chairman and Founder, Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance

Thank you, John. We can go on but let's now move to the actual architectures and practicality of the systems that are either insufficient [or] sufficient. It doesn't look like we're doing too well in sufficiency on these capabilities or if we've got them, we're not using them. But I'd like to start off with JD Gainey who is a senior analyst previous for INDOPACOM. He is in Hawaii today and he has that broad perspective from the INDOPACOM especially on viewpoints of integrated a missile defense and why are we not where we need to be to defend those regions in the Pacific including Hawaii and certainly on the coast of the Pacific of the United States, JD.

Thank you, Riki. Good morning, everybody, it's a pleasure to be here, it's an honor to be with my fellow panelists and board members. So, it's hard to talk about INDOPACIFIC or even missile defense in general against an advanced threat without talking about Guam. I really don't want to talk about Guam this morning, I want to talk about some good things that are that are shaping around to support Island defense or forward defense against the advanced threat in the Asia Pacific and also talk about some of the good things coming out of AUSA last week from the Army's perspective. But the reality that we're in right now Riki is there is a push for hope or discussions about capability in the future tents when it comes to solving solutions today. An old mentor of mine when he was coming out of these executive level meetings would constantly shake his head saying we're making decisions off of capabilities that don't exist, and the threat is real today. So, I just kind of put that out there that you know if we keep going down this track, we're almost writing the script for Pentagon Wars part two. It's just a lot of effort, a lot of time, a lot of energy and to the undersecretary's point we really haven't gained that much ground in advancing towards solutions to combat against these threats.

What I will say on a positive note is as the Army looks through the lens of all the different requirements of critical asset defense that they have in the Pacific, in the Homeland, other combatant commands. Not only have they recognized that they don't have enough kit or capacity to be able to defend all those critical assets they're actually looking through THAAD, Patriot, IBCS as a mechanism to kind of break up subcomponents to give them more flexibility. So just a data point, there's only eight THAAD batteries in DOD right. One is being loaded up in C-17s and heading out to Israel. That is a fantastic capability, that's what the Army does very well. They get up they move, and they provide high-end point missile defense capability. Well, when we look through when the problem set of providing persistent and enduring [Missile Defense] that kind of retracts away from what the Army's main mission and goals are. So, they have realized for a second island chain defense in the Pacific it's not just Guam it's Palau. You move further into the first island chain, you have Philippine requirements, you have Japan Kadena type requirements, and they just don't have enough kit. So, breaking up and going down to the subcomponent level is a good thing, right. They're recognizing that defense in depth and doing upper tier and lower tier all under the same construct is a real thing. It's just like, where is it? We've been talking about it for quite some time. I understand testing and evaluation with missile defense takes time but where is it? INDOPACOM put a requirement out in 2019 for integrated defense and depth and we're 2024 right now and we're still having discussions about who's going who's in charge of this type of integration. Right, who should go out there and fund it and research it? I would offer, as we talk about new approaches to solve these problems, we're in an age where software is providing a major solution for these gaps. So, let's go after software solutions to help with the integration problem set.

MDA doesn't do that, they're the technical Authority for missile defense from the United States. They're not a software entity. We have DIU, we have CDAO. They're the ones who should be grabbing this integration, especially software integration piece, and attacking it. We have a whole software API strategy from DOD so you know that's where that should be. Another comment that the Army is doing well with respect to how it's spreading its capacity with the manning that it has is, LTAMDS is going to deploy out to Guam at the latter part of 2025. It's a fantastic capability, you know it does provide a 360-defense type of capability, not the defense in depth requirements that you seek for an advanced threat like from China, but it's coming out. It's replacing the Sentinel 4 Radars, the legacy Patriot radars. But to undersecretary point about hypersonics and I'm sure Admiral Montgomery is going to talk about it, that is not designed to go after those high-end threats. So we know that they're working hard on the IFPC issues or whatnot the point of at this comment is, defense in depth requires integration. For missile defense there's an old saying in in my world that detect, track, control, engage without system synthesis is no capability. Army is realizing that that system synthesis is real and needs to be accelerated and interfaced with other sensors and weapon control systems. So you know I want to kind of talk through that part and make folks aware.

Mr. Riki Ellison, Chairman and Founder, Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance

JD let's take a look at the bigger picture. So, we talked about roles and responsibilities and if it's on land it belongs to the Army if it's on water belongs to the Navy, but this is an integrated joint mission. Can you do that by assigning one service to do, I'm talking about Guam, can you do that by assigning one service to do this and would that one service have to give all its money and support to it or do you have an integrated joint development like Missile Defense Agency who's built to do this but still hamstring to what they can deliver and produce that whole architecture. How, can you just sort of talk through that a little bit, the pros and cons of where we're going with this.

Yeah, so there's no money to go after joint integrated fires for any type of lethality. Right, there's money that goes to joint coordination pieces for battle management that's high end...

Mr. Riki Ellison, Chairman and Founder, Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance

I'm talking about defensive fire JD.

Mr. JD Gainey, MDAA Board of Directors Member

Defensive fires, it doesn't exist. It doesn't exist, so the Army integrated to Navy to Air Force, it doesn't exist. For some reason it's a hard problem. You know for the life of me we have capabilities today that take desperate systems and put them together under umbrella. PACOM demonstrated last year for offensive fires, which I would offer is a lot harder to do than defensive fires and it's just that we're operating in two different worlds. There's no money for joint integrated fires. Going back 10 plus years to sequestration, JIAMDO who was supposed to have that role in the J8 was supposed to be able to take this and integrate it. Well, they got quartered like William Wallace in Braveheart right and they haven't been able to recover since then. I'm not saying JIAMDO doesn't do good things, they do great things, but they're kind of hamstrung with respect to type of capacity and content. Look at the innovation and the advanced concepts entity it's really absent from a joint accelerator perspective.

Mr. Riki Ellison, Chairman and Founder, Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance

So, you got to go with [unintelligible] train equipment from one service to do it or you mix those. You got to do it is that what you're saying, something like US Homeland defense whether it's Guam, Hawaii, whatever you're going to have to pick a service.

Mr. JD Gainey, MDAA Board of Directors Member

Yes so the way that the Pentagon and acquisition is set up it falls into maybe an agency but pretty much title 10 entities. Title 10, that supports that one stove pipe of acquisition. So the Pentagon manages fiscal risk [and] they transfer operational risk to the to the commanders down the field and say hey here's the kit it's up to you to go figure it out and apply it to your operational constructs and con plans and operational plans. What we have seen due to the pace of the threat in the in the sophistication of the threat we have a mismatch of what's being resourced, what the commanders have to fight the fight with respect to being able to have credible joint lethality in place. So that layer that sits on top to provide funding, provide governance, and to provide acquisition does not exist across the joint missile defense organization.

Mr. Riki Ellison, Chairman and Founder, Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance

Well, how does MDA fit into it. I mean MDA is the developer of integrated missile defense and what they've done in mixing sensors and shooters and creating that whole C2BMC position. Where do they fit in regional defense with a service?

Mr. JD Gainey, MDAA Board of Directors Member

From observing this for the past six years from my perspective, MDA will act upon what has been approved and appropriated. Until that money is in their pocket, they won't move out on it. So, if you look at the past few years either continuing resolutions or the indecision of what the architecture should be, again, we're still having like past few weeks there's conversations at the executive level of what Guam defense architecture should be. I mean, so we can't even figure out what right looks like and if we can't figure out right looks, we can't appropriate the money to go out there and spend it. So, MDA, by the nature of the way that they're set up and the authorities that they have, they can't go out and procure things that are outside what's been appropriated.

Mr. Riki Ellison, Chairman and Founder, Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance

Thank you, JD. We're going to pass it over to Mark now from Ukraine. It' be great to hear what's going on there. But Mark, I know you've got some pretty good opinions on what's happening here and how we can best help our country be defended urgently with the right systems and capabilities.

Rear Admiral (Ret.) Mark Montgomery, MDAA Board of Directors Member

Thanks, Riki. I've had the opportunity over the last couple days to watch pretty significant Shahed drone attacks and cruise missile attacks. Sucks to kind of be on the receiving end of this since usually in the Navy we're just on the giving end. Most of the stuff I've seen we could not do the same Homeland defense that Ukraine does. In fact, I would say all of the stuff I've seen we would fail miserably in defending the Homeland but also in many cases our four deployed forces where in theory we had focused our efforts. So, I'll come back and say look John and JD have done a very good job describing what I would call the lost years. The last five years have been lost years in missile defense and we've left the incoming Administration, whether it's a Harris Administration or a

trump Administration, a long hard work list of missile defense areas. I think it's a mixture of intent, you know as John implied that there's some people who on some of the areas I'm about to mention there's an intent to not do things, I think some of them it's resource decisions and for whatever reason we decided to take risk here. If the last two years of just butt kicking effort, you know Iran against Israel and Russia against Ukraine, haven't taught us have taught us anything is that this Coalition of adversaries we're facing in; China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, 100% see the value of cruise, ballistic, hypersonic missiles as well as drones in attacking you and rockets and mortars for that matter and attacking Allied and Western forces. So, if this was intentional it's awful, it's derelict, if it was just unintentional, it was an awful job.

I'll start by saying first and foremost the defense of Guam, four years on from what I can tell we're resetting. You know, we should have taken Navy ashore four years ago which is what MDA, the Missile Defense Agency, wanted to do for \$2 billion max. We've already built two of them, so this isn't a guess how much it's going to cost. It would have been on US Territory so it would have been less than Romania and Poland. The number one villain in this is the Navy not wanting the mission because in some parallel universe they thought we can't get Sailors to want to be stationed in Guam. Despite the fact we have 3,000 Sailors stationed in Guam. We would have had no trouble getting 60 to 80 AEGIS watch standers and operators and maintenance men on Guam. Okay so the Navy's the first villain by intent.

The next villain was CAPE and Army who accidentally blew things up. They decided to take inherently Naval systems and apply a distributed Network to them, you know an army distributed War fighting concept to them and spread the Radars the launch systems all over Guam. Politically that was you know too big a lift, environmentally it was too big a lift, giving things to the Army like this takes it from 60 to 80 Sailors to a thousand Soldiers. Some of this was corrected by Congress in terms of the vertical launch system just saying hey dummies you're going to buy them, but Congress could not rewicker an architecture through the NDAA.

So as a result the defense of Guam, in my mind, we've lost five years/four years and believe me it took us four or five years to get people interested in it so we've really lost eight or nine years from the original you know arguments by you know it goes back all the way back to Admiral Locklear and Admiral Harris that's how long ago it was at INDOPACOM. I'm not sure there's any way to recover this properly. That's the first sin.

The second sin is a decision to take savings in missile defense capacity. What I mean by that is, in what had to be the most toned deaf budget submission in several years, they decided to cut 156 SM-3 block 1's from the Five-Year Plan in a budget that was submitted in February 2025.

Mr. Riki Ellison, Chairman and Founder, Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance Mark those are the ones that were fired in Israel.

Rear Admiral (Ret.) Mark Montgomery, MDAA Board of Directors Member

Some of them yeah. So, the idea I mean, and I love that you know the Department's like well we didn't do anything, nothing's been affected. I get that the Congress and FY 24 budget authorized SM-3 block 1's and the department asked for them but in the 25 requests they asked to be stupid. The only thing preventing them from be stupid is that we didn't have appropriations occur. So, the department says we didn't do that, you know that's childish, you tried to do it, you want to do it. Then you said stupid stuff like oh we're going to reprogram that money into SM-3 block 2 except you look and there's no change. We were going to go from building 45 SM-3 block 1 and 2's a year to 12. That was this administration's plan. Over the next five years, that's a significant reduction in capability. Where did that money go, not to this, it didn't go to THAAD, it didn't go to any other kind of medium range ballistic missile or intermediate range ballistic missile effort, it was taken into another area. These Dum Dums we going to take risk in missile defense capacity, all right that's number two. There's three more.

You know the next one is this delayed approach to hypersonic missile defense. So for the last three to four years they have underinvested by 50% in hypersonic glide phase intercept defense hoping Congress would bump it back up to the number the department secretly whispered in their ear was the number they needed. So these are numbers like they requested 200 million and Congress would give him 500 million. Congress finally got tired of that crap and said look what we're going to do, they kept them at 200 million one year and said you guys come up with a plan to have Glide phase intercept by 2029. Okay so the department looks at it and says we have two programs, one of them may be less capable delivers early, 2029, and the other one more capable deliver 2035. The one decision you can't make at this point is to down select to the later arriving one because that puts the early arriving one in extremis. So, what did these guys do, they down selected, missile defense agency just down selected, to the late arriving one. Let me tell you something about the missile defense agency, if they say they're

going to deliver something to you in 2034 or 2035, here's the one guarantee it won't be before then, I'll give you another guarantee it won't be on those dates, here's the third guarantee it will be late. So what we're saying is our sailors and soldiers are going to have glide phase intercept, which is critical to thinning the inbound herd and defending our assets against this hypersonic threat, we're not going to see any meaningful you know fielded capabilities into the late 2030s. But the Russians and Chinese are going to have their own capacity to do something in 2030 actual. So, we're going to create these six-seven years where an authoritarian regime has an ability to use a first mover tool to impact the United States. This is insane, we don't do this. We're a rich county, we spend 900 billion a year on defense, what is wrong with us. That's number three, two more.

A laggardly approach to directed energy. The services, the Navy and Army particularly, have been slow; they've been taking your traditional slowpoke role to this dynamic changing technology, and I don't think there's been a sense of urgency. The Navy took the one test ship with Helios and Homeport shifted it, thereby delaying the testing program on that ship for some period of time. I'm sorry if you're committed to this, you're committed to it, if you're not you're not. I got to tell you why you need directed energy because the cost per engagement on those Red Sea intercepts is 2-3 million of our money to shoot down \$20,000 to \$40,000 of their money, depending on whether it's a drone or a cruise missile, that's an insane you know cost curve that we have to get rid of.

I'll give you one fifth one and that's my favorite one Riki, it's the Army's cruise missile defense program. As I've said in the past IFPC, in 2014 I was briefed, it's two years away it's coming blah blah blah maybe it's three years then, now here we are in 2024 it's two years away maybe three years; as I say it's the Phoenix Suns of missile defense, it's always two years away from being two years away. But here's the problem, the enemy has decided that was not acceptable and we needed to tackle this in a much faster pace. This decision to go slow here has left us using a capable Patriot system in its least cost-effective round, you know using it against cruise missiles at three to three and half million in intercept. We needed to drive down that cost curve. So there are five areas where the outgoing Administration has left kind of small burning fires or large burning fires depending on the issue for the incoming Administration. They're really going to have to grapple this whether it's a Harris Administration or Trump administration, missile defense has got to be a focus of effort of the incoming actual Secretary of Defense, not the Deputy, not the Under. The Secretary of Defense is going to have to tackle this because when you're this screwed up it takes the Secretary driving change.

So, look Riki I know that sounds negative, but you know; you and I and John and more recently JD, we've done dozens of these VRT where each of these issues has come up each time. It isn't like John Rood broke the Rosetta Stone yesterday and I'm just commenting on it; I mean we've been talking about this for you know well on two and a half years. This is extremely frustrating, and we need to tackle it, and we need to put the investment in because I'll tell you something our adversaries can study, they know where we're at. I mean we had to move a THAAD battery into Israel that tells you two things; one, SM-3 was low on ships or two, Arrow was low in Israel. Because the Israelis have for 50 years said we do not want US troops on our soil protecting us and they broke a 50-year principle because something wasn't right in the missile defense universe and I'm telling you that's something is interceptor capacity, and we need to get our act together on this, thanks.

Mr. Riki Ellison, Chairman and Founder, Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance

Mark, great analysis. It's done, we can't change what's happened in the past. We have to go forward to make this nation safe. So I just want to ask everyone what is the best solution we can do from your perspective as we go forward and I'm going to detail down. JD I'm going to give you Guam, what's the best thing we should be doing for Guam as a solution that doesn't go down the path that we've just went through for five years. I'm going to ask each one of you the same thing in different capacity but go-ahead JD.

Mr. JD Gainey, MDAA Board of Directors Member

Yeah, so first and foremost you have an AEGIS like capability going to Guam, have a full baseline going out there for a test shot in December. Their SPY-7 and Mark 41 VLS, that'll be out there in December, keep it there. Right, don't try to reconstitute it back to keep working on it, tweaking it, you have some type of credible defense capability in Guam for point defense. So, the first thing you do is don't even think about bringing it back, keep it there, work through the cost analysis of what that temporary deployment looks like. The second thing is, you got to prioritize integration, and you can't do it through common operational pictures or tactical dialing's. It has to be weapon systems talking to weapon systems. IBCS, you know good capability for what was designed 15 years ago, right that's not the answer. There are software techniques that we're using today that you're using on your phone and device watching this that can be applied to accelerate that, and I would offer you can get that done in about 9 to 12 months. So put a little bit of money, couple million dollars, and go after a software integration effect hand it off to sco or somebody like that right let them go dabble in it. The third thing is continue, Army,

breaking apart your larger systems into smaller systems so you have more flexibility for your defense designs out there. That was one of the principles that came out 2019 with the PACOM IMD strategy. You can't take these large systems and relocate it everywhere, there's not enough c17s out there and we don't want to be in a defend the defending type assets construct right. So, start breaking up, start getting smaller, agile. Maybe take a lesson of what the Marine Corps is doing when they're come to their very small but should be, the trajectory their on, credible point defense for further construct in the Asia-Pacific.

Mr. Riki Ellison, Chairman and Founder, Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance

JD can you talk about distributed defense that goes with this and can you talk about what about those platforms with the Spy-6 in Japan that their using for mobile capability on water for their defense rather than a permanent station harder to move on land in Guam.

Mr. JD Gainey, MDAA Board of Directors Member

Yeah, so like it or not the Japanese have figured this out. They're taking what's called an Aegis equipped support vessel, they have programmed two of them, and it looks like a DDG without all the other mission areas. So this is solid state radar, this is the Aegis weapon system, communication devices, and Mark 41 VLS and they're building these ships, you know the these tanker looking ships, to sit off the coast and provide defensive depth for the Japanese Homeland. The next part of that is this is something that maybe we can team together is that handoff between those Aegis equipped support vessel, ASEV, and the Homeland defense design which is primarily Army for defensive [unintelligible]. Those are collaboration opportunities but what the Japanese are doing how they're constructing it they figured it out, so they took the land piece off and they moved it out to the water. We can take some lessons in that right, we can keep our effectors on land but there's no reason why we can't take what SpaceX is doing how they're catching drones and things falling from the sky and their autonomous vessels and put solid state radar and Aegis web system communication devices, put that in a float staging type construct. Push it out off the coast and now you have light defense in depth.

Mr. Riki Ellison, Chairman and Founder, Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance

I would assume that would be on the coast of, if you wanted to, on the coast of the western United States or on Hawaii. But let me just go back to the reality of what we've got. Our shooters are Army shooters that's what we've got. On land that's their mission, that's what they've got, we've got capability today. So definitely that is, it's hard to argue against that, they have it and that's what looks like is going to be the key aspect of putting capability on land. That would their role, their mission, their game. They got to get it together but that's theirs. I don't know if you can separate, I know Mark's position on the Navy and all that, but it's their mission it's the land based mission. I don't see how you get out of that.

Mr. JD Gainey, MDAA Board of Directors Member

It's a piece of land, 200 square miles, in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. So is that a land problem or is that a maritime problem. If you want to use the land as to where you deploy the weapons from okay great, we can do that right now with remote launchers in place, so we don't need all that overhead. You don't need all these troops to go out there and support this mission. If you just take care of the remote launchers, containerize them, put Mark 41 VLS, put them silos into the ground, put some barb wire around it, you're going to be okay. It's a lot better from a manning perspective to be able to support that and you don't have to pay all that additional tax that comes with sending troops out there, the exchanges, the childcare, the barracks, and all that. What'd you say, \$60 billion in Milcom infrastructure or up to or something. Yeah, so look at through the lens of yeah let's use the land for releasing the weapons, let's push the sensors out to sea and start breaking up that content.

Mr. Riki Ellison, Chairman and Founder, Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance

We also got to make sure this is not an exotic architecture. That this architecture can go anywhere that we want. That's what I think might have happened too we became too exotic with it. But let me get over to John Rood to respond because John what is the solution to get missile defense resources policy changed here in this nation. What are your solutions to address this thing as soon as possible.

Mr. John Rood, MDAA Board of Directors Member

Well for the nation as a whole, I think we've got to not handicap ourselves and we're underutilizing space as an example. You know there are tremendous advances that have been made in space technology and the high ground of space is where missile defense as a general matter really needs to move. That being said it's not going to be the only solution, and it will take time so we're going to have to be smarter about how we pursue some of these systems and right now the path that we're on with things like next generation interceptor for land-based defense the United States is too slow. That needs to really be looked at because there's always this desire for the

perfect article but you know as an example the Israelis have shown and we showed in our initial deployment of a missile defense system for protection the United States in the early 2000s, you can deploy successive increments of capability that are upgraded. Going through a perfect 10-year test program or something of that nature before you put any capability in the field is just not paying attention to what the threat is doing and you're really not being practical. But with respect to Guam and in the Pacific, first we are moving as a nation towards more distributed architecture, which I support and that's something we worked on when I was in the Pentagon as well, but at your key operating locations, and there's no getting around it Guam is one of the vital ones, and as much as we'd like to distribute there's not that many choices when you look at the map and where there is land in that vast ocean space and distance matters. So Guam is one of the key operating locations and you're going to have to defend it to a certain level, there's no such thing as an impenetrable astrodome like protection that will protect against any and all strikes no matter the volume but clearly you're going to have to have a level of defense that in a steady state way you can defend against.

One of the things that I wish we would be doing is like Mark was saying, I think bringing and leveraging some of our Aegis solutions for both offenses and defenses for upper tier so-called and lower tier defenses against different threats whether that's cruise missile or ballistic missile. That's essentially the role of an Aegis ship in the carrier battle group and we've paid a lot of money to move Aegis ashore to be a land-based solution we should leverage it. I think what JD is talking about is the next evolution, which is you can make it more distributed you can make it more mobile and more survivable through you know autonomous barges and things like that or lightly manned barges and ships. Frankly the reason the Japanese went to that is crowded spectrum and difficulty with land use and environmental use, well that's very similar to Guam. When some of these solutions were developed one of the challenges we have is you know systems architects or armchair program managers in places like the CAPE look at a map and think well I could just move things around without regard to thinking well that's doesn't match the local geography, politically, topography, or in the environmental rules in the country and so you often run into these kind of mismatches if you will.

So I would like to see us do a distributed architecture at Guam, leverage Aegis Ashore, do things like with offshore vessels, but have a core fixed capability and the role of mobile assets such as transportable mobile systems like the Army has or ship-based solutions like the Destroyers we have is to augment fix based capabilities. The difficulty of plopping a bunch of THAAD and Patriot and other things on Guam is we tried that and fundamentally a very mobile transportable asset is not engineered to be operated steady 24 hours a day 7 days a week. It was tremendously expensive, it also experienced a lot of maintenance and availability issues as a result, and ultimately, we have so few of those mobile assets that if you want to use a mobile asset in a fixed way you're really not using it the way it was intended and it's sub optimized. So I'd like to see us get to something that with lower manning at a steady State way and lower cost can be done because that battery is pretty expensive but you're paying for that for its mobility, its inherent ability to move with the force, or be relocated to crisis spots. Just plopping it down as a fixed asset doesn't make sense to me.

Mr. Riki Ellison, Chairman and Founder, Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance

Thanks John. It's my understanding that you know it's going to take four Aegis ships basically to defend Guam until we get this architecture in place and that's the reason why we were supposed to do this to release those ships. Alright Mark, you got you got the solutions, I know you got them. What are the best solutions going forward to fix this problem by 29 if you think that's the time to fix it.

Rear Admiral (Ret.) Mark Montgomery, MDAA Board of Directors Member

So, listen, first there's got to be a policy commitment to do these missions. There's got to be guidance to NORTHCOM you're the Homeland defense. You know I didn't mention the six issue because I thought five was right. NORTHCOM has not really been given the proper mission authority set. I suspect it's because they would immediately produce a requirements issue which would then require the services to produce a resource requirement which is something OSD doesn't want to deal with. The current administration doesn't want to deal with which is an increased investment. The defense of the Homeland, as we go into the new joint war fighting concept a key element is going to be that as opposed to you know since the Civil War or War of 1812 depending on how you want to look at it, we haven't had to really defend our homeland to this degree, as a little bit in the in World War II but as a percentage of our effort it was in the it was microscopic, this will be a significant percent of our effort to defend our homeland against missile attacks and cyber-attacks and things like that. In neither place are they ready, and for the purpose of discussion today, and missile defense they're particularly not ready. That hypersonic issue I mentioned you know about glide phase intercept applies to both our forward stationed forces but also to our homeland. We don't have the situational awareness tools we need, they haven't committed to some kind of elevated network sensor dirigible aerostat or whatever it is up. There they haven't thought

through the sensor network and a shooter network that's going to be required to defend our homeland so first and foremost it's authorized the right people to do the right thing.

The second thing they have to do is resource things. Some of the problems that I mentioned are resource problems, you know not buying SM-3 capacity, look I wish they the effectors cost less but those decisions were made 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 years ago if your enemy has the capability you're trying to shoot down and you have an ability to do it but you choose not to have the capacity that is a losing choice for your force. You need to actually resource the right things. So there's an example there of where you need resources. I wish I could say IFPC and the defense of Guam are resource issues they were just, one of them is bad program management. I don't know, I'm not an Army program executive but I don't think the Army program executive office, when they teach like best practices, they go take our IFPC work over the last 15 years, model it everywhere else. You know of course they don't. It's a disaster and you know they were told in 2018 if IFPC seems to be falling behind come up with another solution and they were told to go find NASAMS. Now not the Army PEO's fault, the leader of the Army, the Chief staff of the Army General Milley went and picked Iron Dome that was a four-year waste of time. My point on this is that's not a resourcing thing that's a professional management thing by the Army but get your act together on IFPC. Although, I think we're at the point now where eventually it will actually be only two years away. I just you know 10 to 12 years late. But it's the resources. Resources for the capacity you know having the capacity of the current systems. It's the resources into the directed energy.

We have a great question about you know why is the directed energy not there. Well we've answered it, the answer is we didn't put the resources to it. We didn't put the level of effort to it. In the end, the irony is US resources are going to pay for Iron Beam. We've put several billion dollars now between previous payments and then the current supplemental so us resources are going to pay for iron beam and that's a combined US Israeli R&D effort to build a directed energy weapon for the Israelis. You know in some weird Parallax Universe they'll probably sell it back to us and you know and we'll be buying Iron Beam. But they've moved ahead of us, they've caught and pasted us in the directed energy world. I mean they're going to be up at 100 KW.

Mr. Riki Ellison, Chairman and Founder, Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance

Is that is that your answer for the cost Revolution because obviously you're going to have to do capacity with expensive weapons but you can't sustain that fight if the Chinese and the Russians are using 10,000, 20,000, 30,000 drones in mass.

Rear Admiral (Ret.) Mark Montgomery, MDAA Board of Directors Member

Directed energy does get at cost. I mean the problem with directed energy is if I'm captain of a ship in the Red Sea and a cruise missile coming at me or even a drone. I'm not going to say hey you know I hear the Navy's trying to save money on their cost per shot I'm going to go ahead and not engage that with a SM-2 not engage that with a, hopefully we wouldn't use an SM-6 against most of those but, not engage it with an ESSM. I'm going to wait for my directed energy if that doesn't work I've always got CIWS. That CO has got a short career right, she or he is going to get relieved pretty soon on that kind of, even if they're lucky and the directed energy works, they're going to be like no no we prefer our Sailors to live right. So directed energy isn't the solution to everything but in a lot of areas, with drones particularly, it is the solution to a lot of things.

What I would say beyond that is getting the cost of the effectors down, so I'll give you an example on the offensive side I love LRASM the long-range antiship cruise missile. It's \$3.2 to \$3.6 million a copy. That's a little expensive you know when you're trying to buy 1,000 or 1,200 maybe you want 3,000 or 4,000 but having a mix of those and then buying something called Power JDAM with a Quick Sink at 50 or 60 or \$70,000. So, you mix in some lower cost some higher cost so we need to get some more lower cost kinetic kill vehicles introduced into our system. the Israelis have done this with a Tamir round on Iron Dome I think we can work that into a counter cruise missile counter drone capability.

Mr. Riki Ellison, Chairman and Founder, Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance

And to your point, let's go bigger because the NGI is like a 100 million so how do you get that right and that's another that's John Roods discussion of policy of breaking into space to be able to do cheaper.

Rear Admiral (Ret.) Mark Montgomery, MDAA Board of Directors Member

One last thing I say on the policy side. I'm at the point where two of our adversaries are weaponizing space, whether we want to admit that publicly or not that's a choice but China and Russia are weaponizing space and anyone here who believes that, I'm from the old Ronald Reagan School of trust but verify and there's no verifying that those dudes are not going to use space as a weapon. We need to make a conscious decision to weaponize space and give space force the effect, the offensive mission, to go along with the defensive mission

and it's a policy decision. This Administration wouldn't do that you know if you were water boarding them so you know I think it's going to have to be the next Administration to do it. I'm not sure if both administrations will do this, but we're going to need to acknowledge the facts. The facts are our adversaries are weaponizing space the facts are if only one site is weaponized space the other one is that a tremendous disadvantage you know as John kind of alluded to in his discussion. So look, there are policy issues and there are resource issues, we've got to hammer both of them Riki.

Mr. Riki Ellison, Chairman and Founder, Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance

Okay John you want to comment on that or want to send it back to mark for any questions?

Mr. John Rood, MDAA Board of Directors Member

Go ahead send it back to Mark.

Mr. Riki Ellison, Chairman and Founder, Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance

Okay Mark, any question questions?

Rear Admiral (Ret.) Mark Montgomery, MDAA Board of Directors Member

I mean they were great questions, they were submitted ahead of time and I think we hit all four of them. There was one about the cost of Iron Dome I think I hit it with the Iron Beam. You know when former President Trump says things like I want an Iron Dome United States, he doesn't mean Iron Dome systems all over United States. He means the concept of a system that could choose to engage any inbound threat it desire and you selectively engage them and maintain a deterrence by denial capability that's implicit in that and I think we kind of ended on that and I got the iron beam stuff in. So Riki, I think we dealt with the questions I think it was a very spirited discussion.

Mr. Riki Ellison, Chairman and Founder, Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance

Okay well let's wrap it up, five minutes little, we'll be done before that but let's go. JD you're up on wrap up on this discussion today.

Mr. JD Gainey, MDAA Board of Directors Member

So this an opportunity as we pause and relook at the trajectory we're on to apply some of the things that are evolving and coming out of Silicon Valley and worldwide. There are some best practices we can adapt, we need to focus on that. Identify a team or you know some type of program to go after taking you know drone type capability and apply them in the integrated air missile defense construct but we got to break this routine that we're in right now trying to make what we have do things it really isn't designed to do no matter how much money we throw at it. I think this an opportunity for us to almost skip a generation of exploration on what could be and just take something and put it in there's a level of risk associated with it, but I think if you give any type of legitimate capability, demonstrated capability, in a prototype scale the War Fighters will take that a forward.

Mr. Riki Ellison, Chairman and Founder, Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance

Thanks, JD. Thanks for participating. John.

Mr. John Rood, MDAA Board of Directors Member

Well this is a moment for choosing if you will that after the election the American people choose the new election. But I think we should not wait, the administration that's presently in their jobs, you know the interesting thing is all this attention, when you're in the administration, all this attention gets focused on the election but you're still in your jobs after the election. So I would not lose that time, would be my exert to them. And in some ways a lot of the political friction and things around you die away after the election and you can make progress on things. So first we should not lose those months because this is just a critical period of time for us where we are unfortunately behind the threat behind, the threat in space, we're behind the threat in missiles, and missile defense and I could go on but we've got to take that very very seriously. This strategic alignment that's emerged and was building but has really come to the four here between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea presents a strategic challenge but it's that is a major challenge. Something we need to try to the extent we can split them apart but also build our own constellation of allies that is stronger than it is today and then we've got to match capabilities with capability and some of these artificial distinctions this reluctance to conduct military activities in space openly, this reluctance to say you know defense of the United States and the people against missile attack might be destabilizing. [We've] got to shed these barriers to our thinking and get on with understanding what does it take to truly restore stability and to create a safer situation for us going forward and that's going to take a lot of Courage. But it's also going to take money and the money will have to not be new money, it's going to have to come from other areas and we're going to have to make these painful

choices that some traditional capabilities that we've had we simply can't fund at the capability level they were previously funded at. So I think there's this opportunity as you say to assess, reassess, set the table and head out and move which you know above all we got to move out because we're just not in a good place as we sit here today. Thanks Riki for bringing us together.

Mr. Riki Ellison, Chairman and Founder, Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance Thanks John. Mark.

Rear Admiral (Ret.) Mark Montgomery, MDAA Board of Directors Member

Thanks, you know so I'll pick up on what John said. You know I'm a couple weeks here in Ukraine to get in a front row seat to what it's like when an authoritarian regime decides to use missile defense. We got very comfortable; we were so powerful we could dictate what missions mattered. We are no longer in that position with this group of authoritarians working against us. They get to pick missions, they've picked you know missile defense whether you know cruise, ballistic, hypersonic, or drones, rockets they've chosen that as something they're going to invest in. We no longer have the luxury of ignoring it and that's going to, as John said, take resources and policies. I would just say again resourced and properly authorized and we'll be in a much more successful position in a matter of short years and then they'll guarantee our success as we try to execute the joint war fight concept 10 years from now so thanks Riki for having this discussion.

Mr. Riki Ellison, Chairman and Founder, Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance

Thank you, Mark. Thank you, John. Thank you, JD. From around the world. This is a national imperative for our homeland, and it crosses everyone, it crosses political lines, it crosses the stove pipes, it crosses self-agendas or agendas. This is a team game now with a common purpose. It's a common purpose for all of us, for our families, our culture. It's got to be addressed, it has to be addressed and we're right in the thick of it whether the election, whatever happens in election, this has to go forward and as a great team player if you want to be a world champion, you want to keep our way of life, you are going to have to sacrifice and take risk on offensive stuff and put it back into the defensive stuff because we're not defended. We have to be defended or else we're going to lose world order, we're going to lose our ability to support our allies. It's got to be done and thank you today for addressing those issues and bringing light, shedding light, on what the reality is here, truth telling. I appreciate that we're going forward with it, that's our mission. We're going to be loud, we're going to be powerful, we're going to keep coming to make this nation safe and make the world safe so thank you for your time today.