Mr. Riki Ellison:

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, from a crisp, cold spring day here. The blossoms are blooming in Washington, DC. I'm Riki Ellison. I'm the founder and chairman of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance. It is a group that I founded the 2002, missile defense for the safety, wellbeing, stability for our nation and the world. I've been involved with missile defense since 1980. Today, we are going to be focused on a considerable threat to the national security of the United States of America. You know the world's been focused on Ukraine. The world's been focused a little bit on the threats coming from Iran and Abu Dhabi. But last Thursday, North Korea launched a ICBM missile, Hwasong-17, that went around 6,000 Ks, about 3,700 miles, 71 minutes, and that capability proven can strike any place on the United States of America. It is a liquid-fueled rocket. It has the capability to have a payload of two or three reentry vehicles. Two or three nuclear weapons could be placed on that rocket.

Mr. Riki Ellison:

The last time it was tested, this one has never been tested. The last time North Korea tested was their earlier version or previous version of the Hwasong-15, which was done in November, 2017. That one went 4,000 Ks, about 2,400 miles, and put everything on the Western United States, Central United States at risk. They've increased their capability in this test that they proved out. The test was a ballistic test, so it went up and down, so they could do telemetry and study it. It was within their visual range across their country and landed in the sea near Japan. This missile was on parade in 2020 to the world to see. I think there were a couple of them on that parade that they showed. The missile has a unique and reliable engine that's an RD-250. It was bought from Ukraine. This Hwasong-17 has four of those engines. The 15 had two of those engines. This is a real, serious threat to the United States of America and all of its states, its allies in the Indo-Pacific arena. That was last Thursday.

Mr. Riki Ellison:

Since then, there have been some major things that have happened, one of them being the budget drop that happened yesterday. Right now, the budget drop has 150% increase in the spending for missile defense. Our missile defense budget was around 10 billion. The last budget was at 24.7 billion. They have combined offense, long-distance fires with left of launch with this budget. You're seeing a combination of offense and defensive capability grouped around missile defense for the first time. That's a significant movement for our administration, for our country in looking at deterrent, looking at strategic deterrent and tactical deterrent. In this budget, we've seen an increase from about 1.7 billion to 2.5, 2.6 billion in our ground-based interceptors. But more than half of it is going to the next-generation interceptor, the NGI, and the other part of it is going for the reliability of our current ground-based interceptors. Also, this morning, we had our first successful intercept of our newest PAC-3 missile, the MSC, with the radar THAAD capability in White Sands, New Mexico.

Mr. Riki Ellison:

That capability is in place in Korea today, and that is a phenomenal capability that is creating a very large and very in-depth footprint for South Korea. We are in a place where reactions are happening to that test on Thursday, positive reactions. We have a panel today, and we're very fortunate to have the INDOPACOM, who is the COCOM of the largest surface area on earth, that is here today, that this rocket came from his AOR, and Admiral Aquilino has allowed us to bring in his chief of staff, Major General Jamie Jarrard, to speak on that their behalf. Major general Jarrard is an elite warrior, one of our elite warriors of our nation. He is a Delta, and he was command. He was the J3 of our special forces, and he
was also the commanding general of the 25th Infantry Division out of Hawaii. Ladies and gentlemen, I'd like to introduce one of our big-time warriors, Jamie Jarrard. Jamie, all yours.

MG Jamie Jarrard:
Hey Riki, thank you very much. First, I want to thank you for allowing me to join the discussion today. I do also thank you for letting me go first because I think Mr. Rood and Monte have probably forgotten more about missile defense in this AR than I have. I'm still learning a lot, but I know that they will enlighten everybody much more than my comments. But I also want to thank you and all you're doing.
The NDS was released yesterday. To nobody's surprise, the number-one priority remains the defense of the homeland, and the number-two priority is deterring strategic attacks against the United States. I can't think of any organization that focuses on these two missions more than MDAA. Thank you for all that you're doing and your organization continues to do for the safety of all Americans and our ability to sustain the freedoms that we all enjoy.

MG Jamie Jarrard:
Admiral Aquilino sends his best. He's a busy man, got a lot going on. I know he would probably much rather be here than whatever he's got going on right now, but... You asked me to talk a little about the implications of this ICBM launch. The first thing I'll do is I'll just cover the standard, top-line points for the Department of Defense because I think they're applicable here, but the United States condemns the DPRK's ballistic missile launches, that those tests risk raising tensions and are destabilizing to the Indo-Pacific. While the door remains open to diplomacy, the United States will take all necessary measures to ensure the security of the homeland and our allies. We have and will continue to coordinate closely with our allies and partners to address the threats posed by the DPRK and to advance our shared objective of the complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

MG Jamie Jarrard:
I'll talk here in a few minutes about specifically about what Admiral Aquilino and the chairman, General Milley, are doing with our key allies and partners on this topic, and then our commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea and Japan remain ironclad. For additional context behind this recent launch, we've seen 13 launches out of the DPRK so far this year, ranging from short-range systems to the most recently, highly-lofted ICBM. Each time that happens, we participate in a national level of conference to assess the sensor and intelligence data, draw some initial conclusions about the threats to the region or threats to the homeland, and then take appropriate actions. For another perspective, we've also seen over 1,300 launches in the Russian-Ukraine conflict, and we assess every single one of those the exact same way.

MG Jamie Jarrard:
Back to the DPRK, I'd put them in roughly three categories. The first one is research and development. We know they are working to make their arsenal more lethal and more complex, but each of these gives us an opportunity to watch and to learn and consider the implications. Are there advancements or other information that advances what we already know about the rogue-nation threat? Based on the characteristics of that specific test against the expected IAMD performance, how are they doing? Are they advancing? Are they not advancing? It is an opportunity to learn and assess their capabilities. The second category would be provocation. We've seen North Korea launch known capabilities in what we believe are pure acts of provocation, which carry similar implications as R&D, but also, "Who are they trying to influence? How can we respond? What is the best measures of response? Is it from the United
States? Is it from allies and partners? Is it all together?” and considerations for those key allies and partners at risk, and specifically the Republic of Korea and Japan, and then an attack.

MG Jamie Jarrard:
Obviously, we haven’t seen one of those, but that’s the most dangerous. Each launch, if only for a few seconds, shows up with threat fans over our fielded forces, our partners and allies, and now even with the United States’ homeland. Depending on the indications and warnings, can we get the team to a safer stance? Do we have a shot to intercept and destroy? With better increased indications and warning, can we move assets for better shots? Are we looking at a localizement or a major attack or conflict? Here at INDOPACOM, we strive for an free and open Indo-Pacific region, which requires stability.

MG Jamie Jarrard:
These continued development of ICBMs and potentially nuclear weapons, an open-source article today talks about that potentiality in the near future, it destroys stability, not only throughout the region, but also internally to North Korea. Those continued actions continued to provide the justification for sanctions as part of a deterrence mechanism, and that continues to impact the people of North Korea pretty significantly. In the event that these do turn to offensive attacks, what are we doing? I’ll ask another way. What are the longer-term implications of the DPRK’s continued research and development and provocation cycles? How is the threat developing, and what are we doing about it? We’re advocating, and again, as Riki alluded to, very positive developments in the defense budget yesterday as it was released, but we’re advocating for hypersonics and maneuvering vehicles. Admiral Aquilino IAMD vision looks a lot like his vision for other aspects of the theater.

MG Jamie Jarrard:
We’re looking for any sensor that will help us see the threat, improve our sensor network to enable an AOR-wide integrated and layered sensor coverage, a modular open-system architecture to allow us to link with key allies and partners, and the best effector, improve our effectors, both quality and quality, get effectors in the right places, that requires coordination with our allies and partners, access basing and positioning, and a word on the pacing threat. While the preponderance of our IAMD systems are rogue nation-focused, specifically DPRK, in this theater, we’re also working to develop a network that is capable of defending the homeland first and foremost, but also able to protect our fielded forces and help defend our partners and allies against all threats. The Guam defense system is a great example of all of that rolled into one. The FY23 requirement for the GDS, the Guam defense system, was fully funded as part of the budget yesterday. It’s introducing a 360-degree persistent air and missile defense capability on Guam, which remains the most important action the US can take to increase the lethality of the joint force.

MG Jamie Jarrard:
The architecture design for the GDS will include a combination of integrated Missile Defense Agency, Army, and Navy components for air and missile defense. The planned architecture includes land-based defenses, leveraging proven technology found in our command control, battle management, and communication system, the Aegis Weapon System, standard missile interceptor variance, the THAAD, the PAC-3, and other Army systems. The defensive architecture is designed to address the rapidly advancing ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missile threat to Guam. We’ve been talking about this for years, and a very positive outcome of the budget drop yesterday. I’ll close here and take some questions, but our mission is to provide a combat-credible integrated deterrent to maintain peace and
stability, and if necessary, if that deterrence fails, then we must be prepared to fight and win whatever conflict. We've got to have both offensive and defensive capabilities that provide competitive advantages against not only North Korea, but also the PRC and Russia. Thanks for the opportunity to discuss today, and Riki, I'll open it back up to you for any questions.

Mr. Riki Ellison:
I appreciate that very much, Jamie. For us and the public, can you help a little bit, shape us a little bit between NORTHCOM, who's in charge of the US homeland, and INDOPACOM, that has two critical components, Hawaii and Guam, as part of that, and all the allies that you have to stabilize, that aspect of it. You mentioned Guam, because that's our foremost closest to both China and North Korea, and this budget is showing, it looks like, that offense-defense is right there as well to be able to create that deterrent on US soil as close as can to that position. Could you just broadly speak to that a little bit for clarity on how this plays?

MG Jamie Jarrard:
Yeah. Well, thanks, Riki, and I will stay broad so that I hopefully won't misspeak, but for both NORTHCOM and STRATCOM, or really, the strategic deterrence, they own the responsibility for strategic deterrence. However, we are focused more on the tactical and operational-level deterrence. The Secretary of Defense was talking about integrated deterrence, which requires the whole of government. We recognize the military can't do that ourselves. It requires all elements of national power, but it's also integrated with our allies and partners. We have key capabilities that we need both here in Hawaii and in Guam to achieve integrated deterrence. Our allies and partners have key capabilities in their homelands that will help us create, achieve integrated deterrence at a tactical and operational level. While STRATCOM and NORTHCOM both focus on those strategic aspects of deterrence and defending our homeland, we absolutely have a key interest in protecting the capabilities that we will use should deterrence fail and we've got to fight and win our wars. That's why the missile defense in Guam is important. That's why defense of Hawaii is important. Hopefully, that...

Mr. Riki Ellison:
Thank you.

MG Jamie Jarrard:
... helps clarify a little bit the separation there.

Mr. Riki Ellison:
Thank you. Jamie, one more, you saw our reaction with support and funding. Have you seen the response of the Korea launch on Australia, Japan, and Korea, either in their increase of defensive capability or increase of motivation or increase or really strengthening themselves, which it would seem to be, if that's the case, China should not be wanting this to happen, because we're going to get stronger as a team to negate and defeat North Korea?

MG Jamie Jarrard:
A great question, and I think it's probably more complex of an answer than just focused on the North Korea missile launch because of everything else going on in the world. I don't know if it's a singular event or a singular action, because I think a lot of folks are frustrated with North Korea, and so that is
driving some action. I think the Korean president election here, while very close, but did go to a
gentleman who is stronger on the relationship toward North Korea and the defense of South Korea. The
Japanese, I think I read yesterday, just passed a pretty significant budget increase yesterday, with a large
part of that going toward defense. Some of that, I think, is focused on Korea, some of it potentially as a
result of what we're watching unfold in Europe.

MG Jamie Jarrard:
I think there's several factors that are playing into everybody's perception of security around the region,
but I also know that Admiral Aquilino talks out of... After every one of these launches, he's talking to
General Yamazaki and General LaCamera, and Korea is talking to General Won, and so very close
coordination, and amongst the military leaders, about the threat, about how we see the situation, our
assessment of the event, and then coordination on the actions that we are recommending to our civilian
leadership to take to hopefully deter future actions. A couple of different points there, but I do think
that folks throughout the region are taking more interest in focusing more on their security and defense.
Some of that's because of the actions of North Korea. Some of it, I think, is the global impacts.

Mr. Riki Ellison:
Thank you, Jamie. You are the lead dog. You are, right? For the countries to follow. Okay. Ladies and
gentlemen, I want introduce John Rood. He's our follow-up board member. John was the
Undersecretary for Policy for the Department of Defense for, I think, three years, two and a half years.
But during his timeframe, 2017 to 2020, there were no North Korea ICBM watches, so I do have give him
some credit for what he did there. John, the floor is yours. I'd like to start off, John, because John made
it very clear on our last virtual that Ukraine was not a vital national security interest, and today, this
would seem to be a vital national security interest of what North Korea just did. I'll lead off with that,
John, and it's all yours.

Mr. John Rood:
Well, first of all, it's great to be with you, and it's great to see Jamie Jarrard. General Jarrard's just one of
our absolute finest, so it's just thrilling to me to see you in a key spot like you're in, in INDOPACOM. I'll
continue to watch your rise with admiration for all that you've done. For those that haven't been
acquainted with General Jarrard, just absolutely first rate soldier and leader. But when we talk about
where we're at now in the North Korea test, North Korea has had a long history with their missile
program. Early in my career, I was a CIA analyst where I followed missile programs. For a while, the
North Korea program was my responsibility. When there were new developments at that time, when we
were... It was controversial, I recall, when, during the Clinton administration, along with some other
analysts, I wrote, "We see indications North Korea's going to produce an ICBM."

Mr. John Rood:
There were a lot of people questioning at the time, "Are they really capable of that? Do they really have
the means to do that?" But they've had a long history of rather systematically developing greater and
greater missile capabilities. General Jarrard talked about the fact there were 13 missile launches this
year, but it's 13 launches of a multiplicity of capabilities. It's not a single type of capability. These are
increasingly sophisticated, capable systems, whether that be measured in accuracy, range, payload,
capacity, mobility, difficulty for an offensive or defensive force to counter their systems. In all of the
general categories that you would evaluate growth and sophistication, and in numbers, North Korea is
growing in a very noteworthy way. I will say I remain concerned that in our general defense doctrine,
we're not taking missile defense seriously enough. The fact there have been over 1,300 missile launches by the Russians in the Ukraine conflict is just the latest example of this, where missiles are a primary method of warfare. Our defense doctrine does not regard them as a primary method of warfare.

Mr. John Rood:
While I was pleased to see some growth in the missile defense budget, I think it's misleading, the figures that are used, because so much of that, over $7 billion in what's being called missile defense and defeat, is not what I think of as missile defense systems. These are long-range strike systems. Those are valuable. I favor those things, one of the things I'm most proud of for my 10 years as Undersecretary of Defense is that we exited the INF Treaty and stopped adhering to a treaty the other side was not adhering to. Some of those 1,300 missiles that Russia launched were the ones they claimed not to have that violated the INF Treaty. At some point, we had to stop adhering to a treaty the other side wasn't adhering to, and we need offensive capabilities, but they're not missile defenses. They're offensive strike.

Mr. John Rood:
For example, the administration requested $355 million for growth in THAAD defense, which would be the sort of thing that General Jarrard talked about for defense of Guam. That's a very modest amount of money, $355 million, if I read the release correctly, for a system that, if we were facing the 1,300 missiles that Russia was launching or other things, that would not be an adequate defense. I think there are a few things that are the implications of this, and then I'll come perhaps to participate in the questioning, along with you, Riki. It'd be that I think we have to, one, sort of re-polish up our toolkit for strategic deterrence, whether that's in North Korea or Ukraine or elsewhere. Deterrence is an effect that you're placing on the adversary, and we've got to be more purposeful about recognizing, A, missile defenses are part of contemporary deterrence, B, certainly threats of offensive retaliation are part of that, but embedded in this is a denial of the objectives that the party is moving forward with.

Mr. John Rood:
The North Koreans are very deliberate here in when they are launching things, how they are doing it, and the messaging around the world. By denying the objective of those messages, that's part of deterring that behavior and shaping it. We do need to be prepared for failures of deterrence. North Korea has lashed out at times and attacked South Korean vessels, fired across into North Korea with various weapons. We could very well see that kind of behavior. In our case, their missiles are armed with nuclear weapons. I think we're not taking that quite seriously enough as a challenge.

Mr. John Rood:
The North Koreans, we also have to be prepared for not only the possibility of an attack on us or our allies, but they've sold all of their major missile capabilities in the past. It would be very in keeping with their history of their missile program that they transfer these long-range ICBMs to other states. We can deter that, but we have to be very purposeful, that if we want to say that that would cross a red line or that would trigger military action by the United States to find those capabilities arriving in Venezuela or Iran or any of the other friendly regimes to the North Korean regime, we have to put in place the architecture around that to make that a very credible policy.
But I really do think it's quite a significant step. The fact that a missile went up to a very high trajectory and down on a very highly lofted trajectory, according to press reports is noteworthy. That makes it very difficult to do defenses. Any kid that's thrown a football way up high and felt how much faster it was coming back down than a normal launch, the same thing occurs in missiles to complicate the defense. It also expands the reach and makes it quite difficult then to understand what targets are going to be affected and put in place ground-based defenses. I think over time, this is going to drive us to space for defenses, but I've probably prattled on too much. But to me, those are just a few of the implications, Riki, from this kind of test.

Mr. Riki Ellison:
Thank you, John. Could you just speak a little bit on the policy challenges that we have to bring in Japan, Korea, and Australia to share data to... Are we still challenged a little bit with that against a common threat, and how best can we start to get that much better than it is today?

Mr. John Rood:
Well, I was heartened to see that the chairman of the joint chiefs, General Milley, will be meeting with his South Korean and Japanese counterpart. We've had in recent years more friction than we'd all like between Japan and Korea, and we would like to see more of a common defense and sharing of information. Certainly, Japan is America's closest ally in the region, and we've got a very close relationship with the Koreans, so I think sensor data. We have to integrate our war plans and our operational plans with both of those countries in a way that fits where missile defense is not some siloed activity, but is core to that activity because we're likely to face, in those conflicts, heavy usage at very high volumes, think what we're seeing in Ukraine, only being employed at a somewhat lesser state by North Korea.

Mr. John Rood:
You've got to have those governments willing to cooperate with each other, share data. It's hard to isolate. When you think of a conflict isolated only to one country or the other, I find that a difficult scenario to envision. There is that part. The Australians are somewhat distant, but I think it's unsettling to them that you could have a state like North Korea that can threaten them, and they won't have the means to retaliate or to practice deterrence. They've not really invested in missile defenses, but it's something that I think hopefully is going to arouse greater interest there because they've been such a stalwart, capable ally to the United States since anyone can remember, essentially, since Australia existed, and we want them to be partnering with us in our most sensitive areas.

Mr. Riki Ellison:
John, one more question. When we look at Russian capacity of the missiles, take a look at China's overmatched capacity against all of us in the Pacific, that's maybe 10 times greater than what Russia can deliver, we don't have to capacity of missile defense capability at all in the Pacific. It's not being addressed. You might have pointed that a little bit out to it that we're relying heavily on offensive strike, but you got to have some sort of capability, or else you're going to see what's happening in Ukraine happen in Taiwan and happen elsewhere. How do we move the ball in capacity for this theater?

Mr. John Rood:
We have to make a commitment to it. I wouldn't argue for the number of missile defenses to negate every single often attack without any offensive force. If you think of some scenario, the offense has
1,000 missiles. Therefore, you must have 1,000 interceptors. I've always thought that as a tremendously false way of thinking about things. We don't do that in any other domain of warfare. For example, just because the offensive force has tanks that can fire 10,000 rounds, we do not feel like we have to have 10,000 tanks in opposition. We use maneuver. We use firepower. We use many tactics to negate that. How does that translate to missile defense? You have to have a sufficiently large, though, missile defense force such that you can deal with the early phases of conflict before your offense really is engaged and has the ability to attrit and reduce the attacking force. The volumes that we, as you point out, China could and has planned for in their resourcing and deployments of their force, we've not really responded to that.

Mr. John Rood:
I think it's terrific the changes in the funding in the request that General Jarrard talked about to the Congress to fund the Guam defense system. That's been a long time coming, but we're still late to need with that capability, because remember, even assuming the Congress funds it, it'll take some years to put that in place. But A, we need a larger volume of defense to deal with the early phases of conflict, such that we are not sidelined, we're not pushed back to the continental United States or Alaska or elsewhere in order to have operating zones where we can fight from. We have to be in close, and we have to have the ability in the early phases of conflict to defend ourselves. We do need much higher volumes of offensive fires, and offense-defense integration has not been as strong as it should be.

Mr. John Rood:
Think in terms of what we're able to do in an artillery engage. Receiving artillery often receives counter artillery, battery fire. In the area of missile defense, we are a long way from having the ability to synchronize things. Even on an Aegis ship, defense being executed concurrently with offense, it's not as automatic as we see in other areas, and it needs to grow to be a much more effective deterrence and defense, but we also have to look at other means. Most of what we're funding are ideas from 25 years ago. The threat is evolving. We are not employing things such as soft kill, directed energy. We're not employing volumes of fire, and we're not utilizing space in the way we should that makes it much more difficult then for the attacker. We're just employing a lot of the same approaches that are slight incremental improvements to what we've done before. What's going on in Ukraine and the North Korean launches should be a wake-up call to us, but I'm not sure that we're taking it that way.

Mr. Riki Ellison:
Thanks, John. All right, you touched a little bit on Aegis, so we're going to have our follow-up board member, Mark Montgomery, retired Rear Admiral, the J3 of INDOPACOM, so Mark, it's all yours.

RADM (Ret) Mark Montgomery:
Hey. Well, Riki, thanks for having me here, and a real pleasure to follow General Jarrard and John. I first want to say I fully attach myself to everything they said about the seriousness and the importance of this North Korean event. Before I get into too much detail, though, I have to take you on, on the 150% increase in missile-defense spending. Look, this is normal in an administration to kind of make things look slightly bigger than they are, and I do give them a lot of credit for increasing the missile-defense spending, but we're not measuring apples to apples when we call it 150% increase with 24 billion, because we're adding in here some overhead stuff and some missile-defeat stuff.
But I don't want that to take away from the fact they really have invested in missile defense over this past year, especially in the defense of Guam system investments, and then particularly when you combine this with two weeks ago's fiscal year '22 appropriations bill out of Congress, which also pumped up missile defense in a few areas, so really, a big week for missile defense getting properly funded. For those, like the four of us on this call, who advocate appropriate investments in missile defense, this has been a good couple of weeks.

RADM (Ret) Mark Montgomery:
Looking specifically at this attack, like any kind of petulant seven-year-old in a playground, Kim Jong-un wasn't getting the proper attention, and so he went and popped off a pretty large ICBM missile to make sure we were watching him. But we really do have to take a broad approach of getting back at this. I don't use the word integrated deterrence because I think integrated is just an adjective thrown out in front of deterrence. We've been doing deterrence all along. We've been doing integrated deterrence for 40 or 50 years. Sometimes we use the word whole of government, a lot of other terminology for it, all elements of national power, but integrated deterrence is what we need, and an effective deterrence strategy is going to start with some military. I assume that the PACOM is going to be figuring out how to bring SSGNs or bombers or some other kind of cost and position tool into a visible view of Kim Jong-un so he understands that, "Hey, if you really do something serious, we have a lot of ability to impose costs on you."

RADM (Ret) Mark Montgomery:
But I'm more interested in those other elements of power and how we get back at that. It really is time to tighten the economic sanctions and strictures on Kim Jong-un. There's a lot of UN sanctions out there, but he is cheating through small-boat oil transfers with China and Russia, larger cargo shipments that go throughout Southeast Asia. We have to use the Proliferation Security Initiative, other tools, the UN sanctions regimes to kind of tighten down on him, and then we have to go after the actual source of his power. Most of us consider Kim Jong-un and the DPRK's regime as really just kind of a cyber gang masquerading as a government in power. We have to go after their cyber and economic warfare that they're practicing where they're going out and stealing money, ransomware, things like that, crack down on them hard, put a lot of the US attention on that, and then finally, we need to run an information operations campaign against them, the regime and them, and just really aggressively.

RADM (Ret) Mark Montgomery:
We have to get at all these different elements of power. Then, of course, the bedrock is investments in defense, making sure that should he try to respond with something, should Kim Jong-un try to launch something actually at South Korea, Japan, or the United States, that we can both detect, assess, analyze, and kill that missile en route to its target. I think there's a lot there, and I think there's a lot of work to be done, but the good news is this budget was a good budget. The '22 budget was a healthy budget. The resources are being applied. Now we just have to make sure that MDA, the services, the COCOMs, department, and joint staff really get behind an appropriate missile-defense strategy. We may see that in an MDR, a missile-defense review, sometime in the next three to six months. Riki, that's what I had. Unless you have a question for me, I was going to go into the questions that were provided online.

Mr. Riki Ellison:
Hang on, I would just like to have you guys have the opportunity to ask Jamie a question or two to help this thing. I would just want to ask one thing here. When Chairman Milley and the vice chair are working
on the joint war-fighting construct, which is almost done, is this the first place we're going to see that in action, is in INDOPACOM?

MG Jamie Jarrard:
Hey, Riki, I think that we have been working with the joint staff J7 through all of our recent exercises to incorporate pieces and parts of this joint war-fighting concept into all that we're doing. About a year ago, maybe a little less now, before I got into the current position, at some point, we created an INDOPACOM war-fighting concept, which is more of the operational and tactical-level nesting with the joint war-fighting concept. I think that one of the aspects of that is global integration. John Wade, our current J3, he's much better than Monte was. I'm kidding, Monte. You were awesome. But John has done a great job collaborating across all combating commands, not just functionals, with cyber and STRATCOM and space, but also the global combating commands, or the other geographic combating commands to make sure that everything that we're doing has an eye toward a deterrence impact on our priority threats. Short answer is I think we absolutely are already doing that, and we'll continue to do it as the concept matures.

Mr. Riki Ellison:
Thank you, Jamie. It looks like you are the lead on missile defense for Guam and this war-fighting construct, so that's great. I'll turn it over to John and Mark.

Mr. John Rood:
I'll just ask a brief question, General Jarrard. In the articles that have covered the North Korean ICBM launch, there's a bunch of commentators who are saying, "Well, perhaps it's not the Hwasong-17 that was launched. Maybe it's a version of Hwasong-15." But isn't the key takeaway that this was an ICBM, by whatever name, that North Koreans launched that has a substantial capability? Maybe you could talk about, how does it fit into their other... in relation to their broader missile force? There's a submarine launch missile they're working on. There are advanced capabilities for shorter range. As you look at the North Korean force as a whole, how does these various capabilities change your approach and that of our allies in the region?

MG Jamie Jarrard:
Hey, thanks, sir, and I think you're exactly right. Whatever exactly the nomenclature is, it shows an increase in capability and a continuing strive to develop more and more capability. There was, as I mentioned earlier, an open-source article out today about potential nuclear testing. All of it in the aggregate continues to show that nothing that anybody has done here recently is to deterring him from achieving his goals, and that does not bode well for anybody in the region and for the world, for that matter. Back to Monte's point, we've got to figure out the right to deterrence mechanisms, some of that is military, but some of it's got to be the other elements of national power, that will achieve deterrence. Right now, we're not too good at it.

RADM (Ret) Mark Montgomery:
I'll go ahead with a question from the audience here. It's a good one, and for General Jarrard. In the hypothetical event of a war between the US and China over Taiwan, how do you foresee the possibility of North Korea joining in the fight? In other words, what kind of mess could they create?

MG Jamie Jarrard:
That is a good question because there's a question right now, and it's debated in intel circles, and some have more definitive opinions than others, about, "Is North Korea acting on their own right now, or are they in cahoots with others to pose multiple dilemmas for the United States, for Japan, for South Korea, for Australia? How would that play out in a confrontation with Taiwan?" It would absolutely make it more complex. Just like the struggles we have in Europe right now, the majority of...

MG Jamie Jarrard:

Well, there are folks smarter than I am, but one of the problems that we have with Russia is their nuclear weapons and their ability to use those and potential for them to use them, because we just don't know. Everybody says they never thought he would invade. Well, he did. "Well, he's not going to use his nuclear weapons." I don't know if that's 100%. You try to apply some of those lessons over here. Would North Korea deploy their missiles? Would they deploy, and how? Would it be just toward the region, or could it be greater? All of that would significantly complicate a Taiwan conflict. I'm not sure that's a direct answer, but hopefully that helps.

RADM (Ret) Mark Montgomery:

I think that's fantastic. Yeah. You brought up a great point. Your boss, Admiral Aquilino likes to say, "One of the us advantages is allies and partners, and China doesn't have them." He's kind of missing one small thing there. China has one treaty ally, North Korea. Certainly we don't have to worry about it in an actual conventional fight elsewhere in the world, but for the purposes of this, your point was exactly well taken. I think the real thing is the impact it probably has on your planners on... First of all, it means South Korea is not join conventionally in some fight away from home in the middle of this. They've got to be on pins and needles for an attack from the north. It may well for planning purposes pin down US forces on the Korean peninsula that might otherwise be used in a high-end conflict with China. His existence does have a pretty big impact. I think you captured that just right, and then the whole nuclear issue just complicates things even greater.

RADM (Ret) Mark Montgomery:

Hey, there's a question here that I think it's best for John, but after he listens to John answer, General Jarrard can pass judgment on it. John, there's a question here. Should the us be trying to sell THAAD to North Korea now? Excuse me, it's the Republic of Korea. I'm not sure North Korea could afford one THAAD battery, but we'll back off of that for a second and say, should we be considering that kind of sale?

Mr. John Rood:

I think so, if the Koreans want that capability. They have not pushed for that in the past, unless something has changed more recently, but I think it would be a good compliment to their capabilities. They could also pursue things based on the Aegis Weapon System, some platforms, which works for targets further south on the peninsula. For those parts of North Korea like Seoul though that are very close to the North Korean border, the difficulty of a ship-based defense and being able to intercept things is quite difficult. But I think that would be a good addition to the South Korean capabilities. You recall when the United States deployed a THAAD battery there, China took great umbrage at that. But to me, that was revealing that they were concerned that that might actually be the precursor for the South Koreans acquiring some capability and US forces on the peninsula acquiring the ability to defend themselves against missiles, of which China is really featuring that in their military doctrine, in their military-capability development.
Mr. Riki Ellison:
Mark, can I just chip in on this a little bit real quick?

RADM (Ret) Mark Montgomery:
Yeah, of course. Yeah.

Mr. Riki Ellison:
I want to ask Jamie. We've got five THAAD batteries sitting in Texas. We've got Patriots all over Japan, PAC-3s. We've integrated THAAD with Patriot in Korea to make a very dense capability to defend. Why are we not moving those THAAD into the first-island chain to be able to start doing the offense-defense coordination to be able to have a better deterrent when it's real capability right now that we have in existence, not a feature capability, that's sitting at rest right now? I won't be too pointed right at where... It's all yours.

MG Jamie Jarrard:
Hey, thanks, Riki. I'll make a humorous aside to get at Monte. Monte was a much better J3 in the global-force management business than John Wade is. I'm kidding, but it's competition. There's limited resources. How are we arraying those? Then the ones that we do have, how are we posturing them around the region? As Admiral Iron Dome... His vision is that we have more capable, combat-credible forces forward so that we are working more closely with our allies and partners proposed multiple dilemmas. I think that it's a great question, and we're exploring all opportunities to develop a better posture here so that we can achieve deterrence.

RADM (Ret) Mark Montgomery:
Hey, Riki, I'm going to combine the last two questions and say that probably instead of Korea buying a THAAD, they might also look at buying the Iron Dome that I'm confident PACOM would prefer not to have ever brought out in a cruise-missile capability, but Iron Dome in the greater Seoul metropolitan area... A series of Iron Dome batteries might have real effect. It is a high-end counter rocket and mortar, and there's going to be a hell of a lot of rocket and mortar coming down on Seoul. The Koreans already have an experience buying with Israelis with their Green Pine radar, so I just think there's a great... There might be an opportunity in here.

RADM (Ret) Mark Montgomery:
It may not be THAAD and I'm confident PACOM would be happy if the two US THAAD systems were gifted or sold to Korea as a kickoff to that process. I'm comfortable that the Koreans could operate an Iron Dome very quickly, having worked with their forces. I'm sure General Jarrard will back me up. That kind of high-end technology would absorb very quickly into the Korean system. Riki, we're near the end of questions, near the end of time here. I wanted to give everyone a chance to have a final thought and then pass it to you at the end. Does that make sense?

Mr. Riki Ellison:
That makes sense.

RADM (Ret) Mark Montgomery:
All right. General Jarrard, if you want to give us a final thought, and then we'll go to John.
MG Jamie Jarrard:
Hey, thanks for the opportunity to speak, and y'all have taught me a lot just in the short time we've been together, so thank you very much. It's always a pleasure to see Monte and John again, so thank y'all for allowing me to participate. I appreciate your advocacy. I think everybody on this can share a little bit, I think, in the benefits of INDOPACOM in this budget season over the hard work in previous years, so thank you very much.

Mr. John Rood:
Just a brief comment to add on to the end is first of all, it's great to be with all of you, but General Jarrard's theater and your leadership there is just critically important to the United States. There's a lot going on in the world, but in some ways, the North Korean launch can be a blessing to us if it refocuses us on the Indo-Pacific is our priority theater. That's where the things that could remake America's way of life are most likely to occur. The North Koreans, this has been their history. This is not a new thing, that they went to all the trouble to have a very stylized video, to have the leader of the country pose and to brandish this huge weapon in their ICBM.

Mr. John Rood:
This continues a trend that they've done over the past couple of decades. We should take it quite seriously as the capability advance that it is. I hope that this, along with the only good that can come from this tragedy unfolding in Ukraine with this Russian aggression, is that it wakes us up, that we should not be surprised that this kind of aggression is occurring again. A lot of us have been talking about this for years. Now it's here in a way that people are seeing, and we should be motivated by it. Anyways, that's my last thought, Mark.

RADM (Ret) Mark Montgomery:
Thanks. Two quick thoughts. One is I want to give the administration full credit. Despite what's happening in Russia and Ukraine, they're rolling out the NSS and NDS with a strong focus on China as the number-one priority. That takes discipline. That takes leadership to not be bent by horrific video from Ukraine and what Russia is up to, but understanding that you're allowed to have more than one adversary. We have a handful, but you do have to recognize what military is pacing your acquisition and procurement programs. Frank Kendall said it best. About a month ago, he said, "China's still my number-one priority for..." I think he said, "It's driving my top-seven priorities." When you look at the budget the Air Force rolled out, it's clearly driving his top-seven priorities, so big kudos to him.

RADM (Ret) Mark Montgomery:
If I could give one piece of advice, we're going to eventually end up at the negotiating table with the North Koreans again. That's what Kim Jong-un wants. The one thing I'd leave off the table is readiness exercises. We can't take these hiatuses anymore on these. Readiness is a two-edged sword. Part of it is deterrence, showing North Korea that when they fight the US and the Republic of Korea, two plus two equals five, but the other part is our own capability and capacity with the Koreans. We come together for these events. Although we live together and work together, we're not doing every single tactical level event together. These big readiness exercises really drive together that stronger-together concept we have with the Republican of Korea war fighters. We can't take those off the table for the next few years. Hey, Riki, over to you.

Mr. Riki Ellison:
Yeah. Thanks, Mark. Jamie, John, it's your leadership over consistently in INDOPACOM to lead the world and our country. This is no question a national security, vital issue for the US homeland and the United States and the stability of the world order. The world order. That's not going to change over in Ukraine, its going to change here in the Indo-Pacific.

Mr. Riki Ellison:
Your ability to be out front requesting the first part of defense of Guam to enable your forces to go forward, to be able to create the first time we're going to integrate missile defense with missile offense, to engage space, to engage our partners, that we can do much more in this arena than anywhere else in the world with trust and capability, common capability, to create what the world's going to want to see, what we're going to see on how you do this, how you tactically deter a country that has capability and intent that aren't playing by the rules. You set that standard. You set the golden standard. This is not Ukraine, not NATO. This is right here, and this is our homeland. This is the most important theater for the defense of the United States of America and for the world order right here, right now. I commend your leadership, and you're seeing our President and our Congress giving you the resources, giving you the joint doctrine to lead, so lead and win. Thank you.