Lieberman-Sessions Amendment to S.1309 (Amendment 1744)

(Purpose: To express the sense of the Senate on and reserve funds for the development and deployment of missile defense systems to Europe)

    At the end of subtitle C of title II, add the following:

   SEC. 245. SENSE OF SENATE ON AND RESERVATION OF FUNDS FOR DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN EUROPE.

    (a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:

    (1) In the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Bucharest Summit Declaration of April 3, 2008, the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council declared that ``[b]allistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to Allies' forces, territory and populations. Missile defence forms part of a broader response to counter this threat. We therefore recognize the substantial contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles to be provided by the planned deployment of European-based United States missile defence assets''.

    (2) The Bucharest Summit Declaration also stated that ``[b]earing in mind the principle of the indivisibility of Allied security as well as NATO solidarity, we task the Council in Permanent Session to develop options for a comprehensive missile defence architecture to extend coverage to all Allied territory and populations not otherwise covered by the United States system for review at our 2009 Summit, to inform any future political decision''.

    (3) In the Bucharest Summit Declaration, the North Atlantic Council also reaffirmed to Russia that ``current, as well as any future, NATO Missile Defence efforts are intended to better address the security challenges we all face, and reiterate that, far from posing a threat to our relationship, they offer opportunities to deepen levels of cooperation and stability''.

    (4) In the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration of April 4, 2009, the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council reaffirmed ``the conclusions of the Bucharest Summit about missile defense,'' and declared that ``we judge that missile threats should be addressed in a prioritized manner that includes consideration of the level of imminence of the threat and the level of acceptable risk''.

    (5) Iran is rapidly developing its ballistic missile capabilities, including its inventory of short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles that can strike portions of Eastern and Southern North Atlantic Treaty Organization European territory, as well as the pursuit of long-range ballistic missiles that could reach Europe or the United States.

    (6) On July 8, 2008, the Government of the United States and the Government of the Czech Republic signed an agreement to base a radar facility in the Czech Republic that is part of a proposed missile defense system to protect Europe and the United States against a potential future Iranian long-range ballistic missile threat.

    (7) On August 20, 2008, the United States and the Republic of Poland signed an agreement concerning the deployment of ground-based ballistic missile defense interceptors in the territory of the Republic of Poland.

    (8) Section 233 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Public Law 110-417; 122 Stat. 4393; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note) establishes conditions for the availability of funds for procurement, construction, and deployment of the planned missile defense system in Europe, including that the host nations must ratify any missile defense agreements with the United States and that the Secretary of Defense must certify that the system has demonstrated the ability to accomplish the mission.

    (9) On April 5, 2009, President Barack Obama, speaking in Prague, Czech Republic, stated, ``As long as the threat from Iran persists, we will go forward with a missile defense system that is cost-effective and proven. If the Iranian threat is eliminated, we will have a stronger basis for security, and the driving force for missile defense construction in Europe will be removed.''.

    (10) On June 16, 2009, Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn testified before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate that the United States Government is reviewing its options for developing and deploying operationally effective, cost-effective missile defense capabilities to Europe against potential future Iranian missile threats, in addition to the proposed deployment of a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic.

    (11) On July 9, 2009, General James Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate that the Department of Defense was considering some 40 different missile defense architecture options for Europe that could provide a ``regional defense capability to protect the nations'' of Europe, and a ``redundant capability that would assist in protecting the United States,'' and that the Department was considering ``what kind of an architecture best suits the defense of the region, the defense of the homeland, and the regional stability''.

    (b) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that--

    (1) the United States Government should continue developing and planning for the proposed deployment of elements of a Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, including a midcourse radar in the Czech Republic and Ground-Based Interceptors in Poland, consistent with section 233 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009;

    (2) in conjunction with the continued development of the planned Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, the United States should work with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies to explore a range of options and architectures to provide missile defenses for Europe and the United States against current and future Iranian ballistic missile capabilities;

    (3) any alternative system that the United States Government considers deploying in Europe to provide for the defense of Europe and a redundant defense of the United States against future long-range Iranian missile threats should be at least as capable and cost-effective as the proposed European deployment of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system; and

    (4) any missile defense capabilities deployed in Europe should, to the extent practical, be interoperable with United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization missile defense systems.

    (c) Reservation of Funds for Missile Defense Systems.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--Of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 for the Missile Defense Agency for the purpose of developing missile defenses in Europe, $353,100,000 shall be available only for the purposes described in paragraph (2).

    (2) USE OF FUNDS.--The purposes described in this paragraph are the following:

    (A) Research, development, test, and evaluation of--

    (i) the proposed midcourse radar element of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system in the Czech Republic; and

    (ii) the proposed long-range missile defense interceptor site element of such defense system in Poland.

    (B) Research, development, test, and evaluation, procurement, construction, or deployment of other missile defense systems designed to protect Europe, and the United States in the case of long-range missile threats, from the threats posed by current and future Iranian ballistic missiles of all ranges, if the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense committees a report certifying that such systems are expected to be--

    (i) consistent with the direction from the North Atlantic Council to address ballistic missile threats to Europe and the United States in a prioritized manner that includes consideration of the imminence of the threat and the level of acceptable risk;

    (ii) operationally effective and cost-effective in providing protection for Europe, and the United States in the case of long-range missile threats, against current and future Iranian ballistic missile threats; and

    (iii) interoperable, to the extent practical, with other components of missile defense and complementary to the missile defense strategy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.